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Abstract 
 
The increasing relevance of the cyber domain has an impact on the national security of 
states. At current stage, states are in a phase of introducing the cyber approach that best 
coincides with their security needs. While all states share the same threat of becoming 
victim to devastating cyber-attacks, they need to consider whether they take an offensive 
or defensive cyber posture in order to increase security in the virtual domain. This thesis 
addresses the question of whether state size have an effect on the cyber posture of state. 
First, in an attempt to theorize cyber posturing, the study modifies traditional assumptions 
of the offense-defense balance theory and applies the logic of the balance to the cyber 
domain. In addition, this thesis elaborates state size as a specific element that could 
explain an offensive or defensive cyber posture. It analysis whether cyber posture of small 
and large states differs and examines the sensitivity of small and large states to the 
offense-defense balance. In an empirical analysis of the cyber posture of Estonia and the 
United Kingdom, the research examines theoretical assumptions in a comparative 
analysis. The thesis demonstrates that state size has an impact on the cyber posture of 
states. While the UK adopts an offensive cyber posture, Estonia’s strategic documents do 
not indicate the development of offensive cyber capabilities at present the time. Finally, 
the thesis points out that small states are more sensitive to the offense-defense balance in 
cyberspace and adjust their cyber posture according to the offensive or defensive 
advantage.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Cyberspace has become a matter of national security. The use of information and 
communication technologies makes societies increasingly dependent on the cyber domain 
and pushes states to take action in order to preserve prosperity and security. States are 
currently in a phase of introducing the cyber approach that best coincides with their 
security needs. A growing number of governments have declared the cyber domain as 
one of the state’s security priorities and formulated cyber security strategies to strengthen 
resilience, combat attacks and distribute tasks and responsibilities.1 All states share the 
same threat of becoming victims to devastating cyber-attacks. The 2018 Global Risk 
Report of the World Economic Forum identifies cyber-attacks as one of the most likely 
occurring risks in the next year.2 Cybersecurity is of high relevance for every society, 
regardless of their stage of development.  
As a result, states are increasingly diverting considerable recourses into the security of 
national networks and servers. While the emphasis is on defensive capabilities, some 
states develop offensive cyber capabilities for increasing their security.3 This raises the 
question of which are the factors that influence a state’s decision to develop offensive 
cyber tools and adopt an offensive posture in cyberspace. 
In the literature, various authors elaborate the benefits and risks of offensive cyber 
capabilities and scrutinize how these tools alter national security approaches.4 Whereas 
conventional theories have been applied to the cyber domain, the question of cyber 
posturing has been still undermined. In an attempt to theorize cyber posturing, this study 
addresses this gap and contributes to the growing literature of cyber security in two ways. 
First, it modifies various concepts in order to make traditional International Relations (IR) 
theory applicable to the cyber environment. Cyber posturing and factors behind the 
development of offensive or defensive cyber capabilities could be explained by various 
                                                          
1 For a list of national cyber security strategies see: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence, ‘Cyber Security Strategy Documents’  
2 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2018 
3 The World Street Journal currently lists 29 states that include offensive components in their military 
strategy. See: The Wallstreet Journal, ‘Cataloging the World's Cyberforces’ 
4 See for example: Kello, The virtual weapon and international order; Choucri, Cyberpolitics in 
international relations; Lewis, Rethinking cybersecurity; Lin, ‘Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use 
of Force’; Peterson, ‘Offensive Cyber Weapons’; Lewis, Rethinking cybersecurity 
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well-established theories.5 This research utilizes offense-defense balance theory to 
explore state posturing and applies this logic in the cyber domain. In line with neorealist 
thinkers, the thesis assumes that the offense-defense balance determines a state’s cyber 
posture.6  
Second, in addition to the more general concern of applying IR theory in cyberspace, this 
study seeks to highlight state size as a specific element that has been so far neglected in 
studies of offense-defense theory. The few existing studies, which apply conventional 
offense-defense theory to the cyber domain, make no distinction between small and large 
states.7 This thesis addresses this gap by examining how size is linked to a certain cyber 
posture. Contributing to small states literature, this research explores how small states 
deal with the cyber domain from their specific position and presents new findings 
regarding their cyber posturing. 
The aim of the thesis is to explore how state size matters for which offensive or defensive 
cyber posture a state adopts. It analysis whether cyber posture of small and large states 
differs and examines the sensitivity of small and large states to the offense-defense 
balance. Accordingly, the research question of this thesis is the following: what effect 
does state size have on the cyber posture of state? Derived from offense-defense theory 
and small state literature, the thesis hypothesizes that small states adopt a cyber posture, 
which closely corresponds to the offense-defense balance, whereas cyber posturing of 
large states might deviate from the balance. Depending on whether offense or defense has 
the advantage in cyberspace, small states rather opt for an offensive or defensive cyber 
posture, whereas large states have more leeway to choose. Moreover, the thesis assumes 
that there is no difference in cyber posture of small and large states, as the offense-defense 
balance effects both states in a similar way. 
Methodologically, this study makes use of a comparative analysis, comparing the cyber 
posture of the United Kingdom and the Estonian Republic. The UK represents a large and 
                                                          
5 For instance, deterrence theory distinguishes between deterrence by retaliation (offensive) and 
deterrence by resilience (defensive), which could be an explanatory approach to cyber posture. See 
Freedman, Deterrence 
6 For attempts to theorize offense-defense in the cyber domain, see Saltzman, ‘Cyber Posturing and the 
Offense-Defense Balance’. 
7 See for example: Locatelli, ‘The Offense/Defense Balance in Cyberspace’; Shaheen, ‘Offense-Defense 
Balance in Cyber Warfare’ and Locatelli, ‘The Offense/Defense Balance in Cyberspace’ 
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Estonia a small state. The empirical part focuses separately on cyber doctrine and cyber 
capabilities in order to identify an offensive or defensive cyber posture. 
The theoretical part of this thesis (chapter 2) is structured as follows: First, it engages 
with offense-defense theory. The offense-defense theory is the independent variable to 
explain cyber posture of states. How does offense-defense theory may explain the choice 
for an offensive or defensive posture and which factors influence the offense-defense 
balance? Second, derived from conventional offense-defense theory, the thesis transfers 
the assumptions to the cyber domain and adjusts the main concepts accordingly. How 
does the logic of the offense-defense balance function in the cyber domain? In this 
discussion, the study does not aim to answer the question of whether offense or defense 
has the advantage in cyberspace, but rather discusses how the advantage of either offense 
or defense affects theoretical expectations of state posture in the cyber domain. Third, the 
thesis delves into the literature of small states in international security with the aim to 
establish how small states shape posturing. Additionally, these assumptions are theorized 
against the background of the cyber domain. How does state size shapes the decision to 
adopt an offensive or defensive posture in cyberspace? Do the adjusted factors of offense-
defense balance theory have influence on small state’s cyber posture in the same way they 
have on large states? 
The theoretical considerations are followed by the methodology part (chapter 3), which 
defines the methodological parameters of this thesis. The empirical part (chapter 4) 
scrutinizes cyber posture of the UK and Estonia to test the hypothetical assumptions. The 
aim is to provide an illustration of the theoretical argument and discuss it in a comparative 
perspective. The conclusion (chapter 5) summarizes findings of this thesis.  
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2 Theorizing the offense-defense balance and state size in cyberspace 
 
The following chapters frame the theoretical part of this research. First, it conceptualizes 
cyberspace and points out various characteristics that are necessary in order to understand 
the basic principles of the virtual domain and their relevance for national security. Second, 
the following part illustrates the traditional offense-defense balance and examines how 
the same logic can be applied to the cyber domain. Particular emphasis will be placed on 
the distinction of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Finally, the concluding 
chapter of the theoretical part focuses on small states and theorizes their posture in the 
virtual domain. 
 
2.1 Cyberspace and national security 
Cyberspace is often considered as the fifth domain beside land, sea, air and outer space.8 
Due to its fundamental difference from traditional domains, the cyber domain poses a 
challenge to strategists, military planners and analysts. This section conceptualizes the 
main elements of cyberspace and contrasts them to the three domains of land, sea, and 
air. The aim is to provide a brief overview of cyberspace’s main characteristics and 
highlight challenges regarding the different environment from a national security 
perspective.  
The concept of space is a crucial element in International Relations theory. In world 
politics, states attempt to use all types of space to exercise power and influence. Thereby, 
they use technologies to make space more accessible and usable. For a long time, states 
operated only on land and at sea. The technological advances of vehicles and ships were 
of high strategic importance. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the air space became 
a decisive domain in terms of warfare. Military planes were used to increase military 
power and react more quickly and precisely to military threats. The notion of space is 
thereby often linked to territoriality.9  
                                                          
8 This thesis uses the terms cyberspace, cyber domain and virtual domain interchangeably. For 
information on cyberspace as the fifth domain, see for example: THE ECONOMIST, ‘War in the fifth 
domain: Are the mouse and keyboard the new weapons of conflict?’, 1 July 2010 
9 Choucri, Cyberpolitics in international relations, 5 
 5 
 
In the literature, the concept of cyberspace is blurred.10 The impact of the new domain is 
significant for political, economic and social life. Economic actors conduct money 
transactions, politicians increase their popularity, terrorists plan attacks and military 
forces increase their power and efficiency. Cyberspace is an “operational domain”11 in 
the sense of being useful to communicate, store and exchange information. This thesis 
looks at cyberspace from a security perspective. 
Libicki provides a useful three-layered conceptualization of cyberspace. Firstly, the 
physical layer contains computer hardware, routers and partially wires. These 
components are foundational and existential for cyberspace, making that the domain is 
entirely reliant on electronic devisces. Secondly, the syntactic layer consists of the code 
that enables hardware components to communicate with each other. The hardware 
components of the physical layer require software to function. Programmers and system 
designers use codes to instruct machines and give them tasks to complete. The syntactic 
layer is crucial when it comes to system hacking. As elaborated in the following chapters, 
intruders seek to alter codes in a way that they gain authority over the system and use the 
system for own purposes. Thirdly, the semantic layer is the information that is stored in 
cyberspace, i.e. on a server or computer device. The information is what users of 
cyberspace receive when they enter the domain. Libicki correctly indicates that attacks 
can take place on the semantic level due to the spread of false information.12 Although 
these attacks certainly have influence on a state’s national security, this thesis is based on 
a conceptualization of cyber-attacks that takes place on the syntactic level.  
Each of the three layers depends on the former one and cannot function without it. 
Software must be installed to hardware and information can be only accessed when the 
software enables the hardware to display it. On the contrary, destroying the semantic layer 
has no effect on the former two, nor does destroying the syntactic layer affect the 
existence of the physical components themselves.13 Clark extents the model with a fourth 
layer that can be placed above the semantic layer. The fourth layer consists of the people 
                                                          
10 For a table of different definitions of cyberspace see Kuehl, ‘From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: 
Defining the Problem’, 26–7 
11 Ibid., 29 
12 Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, 12–3 
13 See further elaboration on Libicki’s Model in: Bryant, International conflict and cyberspace 
superiority, 53 
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who act in cyberspace. People contribute to the domain by adding content to the network 
and develop it further.14 For the purposes of this study, it is useful to include people in 
the model. People are considered one of the greatest risks for network security. Especially 
for a state’s most protected critical infrastructure that is controlled via a closed intranet 
system, people pose the greatest danger to penetrate the system by connecting infiltrated 
devices.15  
Having characterized the main components of cyberspace, the following section 
highlights various aspects that make the cyber domain distinct from other domains. 
Pointing out these characteristics is a necessary step to take before applying the 
conventional offense-defense balance theory to the cyber domain. Moreover, it underlines 
the argument of a security dilemma in cyberspace and the analysis of states’ cyber 
posture.  
To begin with, cyberspace, in contrast to the conventional domains, is a virtual domain 
designed by humans and not existing in nature.16 In the conventional domains, people use 
technology to make land, sea, air and outer space usable. While ships, planes, cars and 
railways were invented and developed to utilize air, land and sea, in cyberspace the 
technology itself constitutes the domain.17 This aspect is central, as it outlines the 
consequences and limits of cyber-attacks. The more society is reliant on the virtual 
domain, the higher the damage of a cyber-attack. Due to a drastic increase in the 
dependency on the internet, the cyber domain gains increasing significance. However, in 
contrast to the conventional domains, states could theoretically decide to withdraw from 
the cyber domain and cut off internet access to their citizens. 
Moreover, on the internet, the concept of borders does not apply to cyberspace in the 
same way as it does to the conventional domains. Border studies provide a wealth of 
literature that discusses how the traditional concept of borders changes with globalization 
                                                          
14 Clark, ‘Characterizing cyberspace: past, present and future’, 4 
15 See for example: Jackson, William, ‘The security singularity: When humans are the biggest problem’. 
GCN, 23 September 2011 
16 See for i.e. Kuehl, ‘From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem’, 30. According to Kuehl, 
this view is only half true. He points out that the cyberspace is still based on physical characteristics (e.g. 
electromagnetic spectrum): ibid. 
17 Ibid., 29 
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and the global expansion of the internet.18 Vinton Cerf, the “father of the internet”, states 
that “the internet was designed without any contemplation of national boundaries” and is 
therefore “totally unbound with respect to geography”19. From the security perspective, 
it could be said that all states are neighbors to one other.20 However, this does not mean 
that national borders have become obsolete.21 States operate on the basis of a territorial 
logic and consider themselves responsible for the provision of security inside their 
territorial boundaries. States project this logic into the cyber domain when they, for 
instance, aim to secure their citizens, companies, digital infrastructure, etc. For the sake 
of security, states seek to gain control over actions in cyberspace.  
From a legal perspective, cyber actions taking place inside state boundaries are matter of 
domestic jurisdiction. People acting in cyberspace are still located in a state with certain 
legal provisions. For instance, several states have introduced regulations that force 
companies to store information about their citizens on servers located within the state’s 
territorial boundaries.22 Others create firewalls that restrict access to information on the 
internet.23 
When it comes to cyber-attacks, the geographic locations of attackers and victims do not 
play a role, as attacks can be launched independently from any device that has access to 
the internet. In addition, geographic characteristics such as mountains, rivers and oceans 
do not affect the attack as long as the malicious code has reached the targeted system.24 
As geography is a key variable in the traditional offense-defense balance theory, the 
following chapters provide a more detailed view on what can be seen as equivalent to 
geography in the cyber domain.  
                                                          
18 See for example: Hare, ‘Borders in Cybespace: Can Souvereignty Adapt to the Challanges of Cyber 
Security?’ and ibid. 
19 Guernsay, Lisa, ‘Welcome to the World Wide Web. Passport, Please?’. New York Times, 15 March 
2001 
20 Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, 106 
21 Goldsmith and Wu, for instance, illustrate the significance of geography in cyberspace. Their main 
argument relies on the heterogeneity of internet users and their demands (language, geographical 
identification technology etc.) See: Goldsmith and Wu, Who controls the Internet?, 58–63 
22 See for example: Cohen et al., ‘Data Localization Laws And Their Impact on Privacy, Data Security 
And the Global Economy’ 
23 For instance, the Great Firewall of China regulates the internet flow between China and the outside 
world. The firewall allows Chinese citizens to connect with foreign countries for economic purposes, but 
seeks to censor Western ideology. For an overview, see Sammarco, ‘The Great Firewall and the Perils of 
Censorship in Modern China’ 
24 Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, 106 
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Furthermore, attributing cyber-attacks is an issue that challenges states to draw the correct 
conclusions and react appropriately to cyber-attacks.25 Actors in the domain are more 
difficult to identify than in the physical domains. When using proxy servers, it is 
technologically possible for online actors to conceal their identities. Determining the 
origin of the threat requires time and financial resources and does not always lead to a 
certain result. Another example is the Great Firewall of China, which regulates the 
internet flow between China and the outside world. The firewall allows Chinese citizens 
to connect with foreign countries for economic purposes but seeks to censor Western 
ideology.26 
Another characteristic worth considering is the wide range of actors that operate in 
cyberspace. The threat to a state’s security may originate from individual hackers, 
organized crime or hostile governments. In principle, a single computer device connected 
to the internet is capable of entering the virtual domain and developing it further. No 
entity owns the internet and governments, companies and individuals all enter the 
cyberspace in the same way. Accordingly, all actors face the dangers that occur when 
operating in the cyber domain. In the same vein, all actors are potentially able to pose a 
danger. Even individual hackers may inflict high damage with relatively low costs. Thus, 
non-state actors can wield considerable power in the cyber domain. Consequently, in 
comparison to the physical domains, states enter into competition with a wide range of 
actors and do not have the same monopoly on the operational level.27 These observations 
have implications for security studies and challenge International Relations theory in 
general. They undermine the state-centrism of the conventional offense-defense theory, 
as not only armed forces matter, but also professional hackers having the skills to 
penetrate networks and cause harm to societies.  
However, an advanced cyber-attack that causes danger to a state’s critical infrastructure 
requires advanced technological skills and financial support in order to bypass security 
systems. Lewis, for instance, argues that “the most dangerous and damaging attacks 
required resources and engineering knowledge that are beyond the capabilities of non-
                                                          
25 For a discussion on the attribution problem, see: Rid and Buchanan, ‘Attributing Cyber Attacks’, 5 
26 For a brief overview, see Sammarco, ‘The Great Firewall and the Perils of Censorship in Modern 
China’ 
27 Reveron, ‘An Introduction to National Security and Cyberspace’, 6 
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state actors, and those who possess such capabilities consider their use in the context of 
some larger strategy to achieve national goals”.28 Therefore, the number of actors behind 
sophisticated cyber-attacks can be reduced. This research narrows its focus to states and 
considers them the most powerful actors in cyberspace.29 States possess sustainable 
financial resources to plan and conduct high-level cyber operations. Therefore, state-to-
state interaction is a key consideration for national cyber security and the cyber security 
dilemma, even though attacks by non-state actors occur more often.  
To summarize, this chapter first presented a definition of cyberspace that establishes the 
conceptual baseline for this thesis. In short, cyberspace is a virtual domain consisting of 
physical components, virtual software and stored information created and maintained by 
people. The opportunity to exploit the domain through cyber-attacks makes it a national 
security issue. The significance for a state’s security is rising with the increasing 
dependence of people and machines on the internet, which is the backbone of cyberspace. 
The second part of this chapter underlined the main characteristics of the cyber domain. 
The projection of traditional theory onto the cyber domain requires a closer look at the 
role of borders, threat actors and the general construction of the virtual domain. Even 
though the elaborations in this chapter provide only a brief introduction into how 
cyberspace functions, it suffices to apply conventional theoretical assumptions to the 
cyber domain. 
 
2.2 Offense-defense theory 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical considerations 
The offense-defense balance is a central variable of the security dilemma.30 First, this 
section briefly illustrates the main arguments of the security dilemma in order to 
understand the logic behind the offense-defense balance. These theoretical considerations 
are necessary to understand why states opt for an offensive or defensive cyber posture. 
                                                          
28 Lewis, Rethinking cybersecurity, 7 
29 States may act through a complex network of hacking groups. However, in such a setting, the state 
remains the actor in charge, even though it is often difficult to observe a clear link between hacking 
groups and the state. 
30 Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, 186–7 
 10 
 
Secondly, this section includes an illustration of the offense-defense balance and 
scrutinizes how the assumptions can be applied to the cyber domain. Thirdly, derived 
from offense-defense theory, this section seeks to formulate a conceptualization of state 
posture that is used as the dependent variable throughout this thesis. 
The security dilemma is an essential lens through which International Relations scholars 
can explain a state’s security behavior and the outbreak of conflicts.31 The precondition 
of the dilemma is the anarchic character of the international system. Without a higher 
authority, states find themselves in a “self-help system”, in which they take precautions 
in order not to become a victim of outside aggressors.32 Consequently, states are trapped 
in the security dilemma when a state increases its security while decreasing the security 
of other states, which need to respond similarly even though they did not intend to do 
so.33  
According to Booth and Wheeler, the security dilemma consists of two levels with 
different strategic predicaments: the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of 
response.34 Firstly, states face the dilemma of interpretation “(…) when they are 
confronted, on matters affecting security, with a choice between two significant and 
usually (but not always) undesirable alternatives about the military policies and political 
postures of other entities.”35 Governments have to assess a perceived threat and take a 
decision regarding the intentions, motivations and capabilities of other actors under 
conditions of “unresolvable uncertainty”. One dimension of unresolvable uncertainty is 
the “other minds problem”, which stems from psychology. It is based on the assumption 
that foreign policy actors are hardly able to fully understand other state actors. Although 
states can scrutinize each other’s behavior to a certain degree, they can never be confident 
about other states’ intentions.36 Another dimension that result from unresolvable 
uncertainty is the “ambiguous symbolism of weapons”37. Governments are challenged to 
discern whether a potential adversary is developing its military capabilities for defensive 
                                                          
31 See for example: Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma; Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security 
Dilemma’; Glaser, ‘The Security Dilemma Revisited’ and Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma 
32 Lynn-Jones, ‘Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics’, 664 
33 Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, 169 
34 The definition of the security dilemma sis taken from: Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, 4 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 42 
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or offensive reasons. States develop defensive capabilities in order to guarantee their own 
security in a constantly competitive environment and offensive capabilities in order to 
alter the status quo for their own benefit.38 
The second predicament, the dilemma of response, arises when decision makers believe 
they are certain about the intentions of the potential adversary. Consequently, they have 
to determine an appropriate response. The policy tool used to respond significantly 
influences the outcome of the dilemma. On one hand, misplaced trust towards another 
state may result in the state becoming a victim of an adversary that aimed to change the 
status quo. On the other hand, misinterpretation based on suspicion may result in an 
unintended military conflict. The phenomenon by which states escape the dilemma by 
using methods that result in enmity, although both originally have not intended to enter 
into confrontation, is defined as the security paradox.39  
For this thesis, the dilemma of interpretation is more relevant. States adopt their force 
posture according to their security concerns, which is based on how they interpret the 
intentions of potential adversaries. Neorealist authors ascribe “security-seeking states”40 
two different force postures to increase their security: offensive and defensive.41 The 
offense-defense balance, as a key variable of the security dilemma, sheds light on the 
question of why states adopt a certain posture. The central element of the balance is the 
“ambiguous symbolism of weapons”, which includes the offensive-defensive distinction 
of weapons and the resulting question of whether the offense or the defense has the 
advantage. Assuming that defensive and offensive weapons are distinguishable and that 
defense has the advantage, states may increase their security without (or only to a small 
extent) causing a decrease in the security of other states. States are better off focusing on 
the protection of their territory and adopting a defensive force posture.42 On the other 
hand, when offense has an advantage, “available technologies make it less expensive for 
                                                          
38 Ibid., 42–5 
39 Ibid., 4–5 
40 Security dilemma theory categorizes states into security-seeking and greedy states, determined 
according to their motives. For further terms of this classification see Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy 
for Our Time, 24 
41 See for example Lynn-Jones, ‘Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics’, 665 
42 Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, 186–7 
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states to seek security by adopting offensive military postures and strategies.”43 Thus, the 
offense-defense can be defined as the “ratio of the cost of the forces the attacker requires 
to take territory to the cost of the forces defender has deployed”44. In this regard, the 
offense-defense balance could serve as an explanation of why states adopt an offensive 
or defensive posture. In a security environment where offensive weapons predominate, 
the theory suggests that states have more preferences to adopt an offensive posture. 
Contrary, a defensive advantage suggests that states opt for a defensive posture.45 
Slayton applies the logic of the offense-defense balance to the cyber domain by using a 
utility-cost ratio conceptualization of offense to defense. According to her, the “utility 
advantage of cyber offense is the value of the offensive goal (e.g., taking territory, stealing 
secrets, or gaining control of a computer) less the minimum costs of achieving it”46. 
Accordingly, “the utility of the defense is the value of the defensive goal (e.g., holding 
territory, maintaining secrecy, keeping control of a computer) less the minimum costs of 
defense”47. Depending on whether offense or defense utility is higher, offense/defense 
has the advantage in the cyber domain and states are expected to favor either an offensive 
or defensive cyber posture.  
The offense-defense balance is influenced by various factors, which determine whether 
offense or defense has the advantage. In the literature, there is a distinction between the 
“broad” and “narrow” approach to operationalizing the offense-defense balance. While 
the narrow approach includes only geography and technology, the broad approach adds 
variables such as force size, nationalism and cumulativity of resources to measure the 
balance.48 The following examination is based on a narrow approach, which includes the 
factors of geography and technology and scrutinizes their applicability in the cyber 
domain. Furthermore, the section contains various considerations of what could 
determine state posture in cyberspace. 
                                                          
43 Lynn-Jones, ‘Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics’, 674–5 
44 Glaser and Kaufmann, ‘What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it?’, 55 
45 These assumptions count when states are equal in power. Even though the defense could have an 
advantage, the outcome may be distorted by powerful states that turn the balance to their advantage due to 
their superiority. See: ibid., 51 
46 Slayton, ‘What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?’, 80 
47 Ibid. 
48 Glaser and Kaufmann, ‘What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it?’, 60–1 
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To begin with, applying offense-defense balance theory to the conventional domains, 
geographic environment often provides advantages for the defender. An army needs to 
cross mountains, rivers, oceans or other territory-linked obstacles for which it is unlikely 
to be as well prepared as the defender.49 In the cyber domain, these geographic obstacles 
are not present.50 Malicious code can be send around the world with high speed and 
concrete targets. One could argue that the internet is based on the physical existence of 
wires connecting electronic machines and servers. As described in the previous chapter, 
the first layer is existential for the internet to work. Destroying the physical infrastructure 
of the internet would indeed have fundamental effects on accessing and using the cyber 
domain. In theory, these wires could be geographically located and attacked. However, 
firstly, it is practically impossible to endanger cyberspace by cutting the wire, as cyber 
networks consist of too many intertwined cable connections that can replace the 
interrupted wire.51 Due to earthquakes and outdated materials, it is in fact common for 
internet wires to be interrupted and to require repair. Secondly, an attack on the 
Transatlantic Telecommunications Cable, for instance, which connects North America 
with Europe (TAT-14), would require financial resources and appropriate technology that 
would be disproportionate to the damage such an interruption would cause. Thus, the non-
existence of a geographic factor in cyberspace suggests that offense has an advantage in 
the sense that aggressors do not need to overcome natural obstacles.52  
However, there is another crucial aspect to add to this discussion. The geographic factor 
indicates the vulnerability of a state to outside threats. The offense-defense theory 
assumes that states with natural obstacles are less vulnerable to potential aggressors and 
better at defending their territory. Bringing in the small/large distinction, in the 
conventional domains a large territory is more difficult to attack than a small one. 
Therefore, large states are by definition better protected by the geographic factor than 
small states. However, state size and geographic factors do not help to understand the 
cyber postures of small and large states. In the cyber domain, the geographic environment 
is no obstacle to the placement of malicious code onto foreign networks. Instead, 
                                                          
49 Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, 194–5 
50 Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, 106 
51 An insightful overview of all submarine cables see: TeleGeography, ‘Submarine Cable Map’ 
52 Various governments seek to gain control over their national networks by creating virtual obstacles 
(e.g. national firewalls). The next chapters discuss these issues in detail.  
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digitalization could be understood as the cyber equivalent, which may similarly affect 
cyber posture.  
The degree of digitalization constantly increased during the last decades and will continue 
to rise. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) predicts an increasing 
number of interconnected computer devices, up to 25 billion by 2020.53 Most of them 
belong to the consumer realm, such as household appliances, medical technology, devices 
for private businesses and public authorities, etc. In addition, manufacturing, 
transportation and utility companies increasingly make use of technological devices to 
enhance productivity and improve operational processes. For offense-defense balance 
theory, digitalization of the critical infrastructure sector matters the most, as it has the 
greatest impact on a state’s national security. The most vulnerable critical infrastructure 
in the cyber domain includes energy, healthcare, the financial industry, the 
military/defense industry and transportation.54  
The degree of digitalization suggests that the greater a state is digitalized, the more 
dependent it is on cyber technologies and the greater the surface for attacks. In other 
words, an increasing degree of digitalization increases a state’s vulnerability in 
cyberspace. The degree of digitalization is what states decide upon in order to gain 
economic and social advantages. In contrast to the traditional domains, it is not given by 
nature. It seems that the degree of digitalization does not play a considerable role when 
comparing small and large states. Large and small states could have the same degree of 
digitalization and are therefore in the same manner vulnerable to cyber-attacks. For this 
reason, digitalization does not necessarily correspond to a difference in the cyber posture 
of small or large states.  
What impact does digitalization have on the offense-defense balance? Contrary to 
geography, digitalization seems to turn the balance towards the offense for the following 
reasons. First, a digitalized infrastructure provides intruders broader opportunities to 
cause damage and makes it harder to defend. Companies, organizations and state 
authorities make use of the same software. The WannaCry malware attack conducted in 
                                                          
53 International Telecommunication Union, ‘Getting ready for the digital economy’, 4 
54 An executive order by former US-president Barack Obama lists 16 sectors of critical infrastructure and 
includes both physical and cyber-attacks in its strategy to defend these sectors: The White House, 
Presidential Policy Directive - Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
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May 2017 serves as an appropriate example. The attacker exploited a security gap in the 
Windows operating system and blackmailed users to pay before unlocking their 
computer. The ransomware infected around 300,000 computers in 150 countries55 and 
affected a wide range of sectors, such as transportation, telecommunication, energy, 
shipping and health care.56 Even though WannaCry does not fall into the category of state-
to-state attacks, it demonstrates the vulnerability of cyber infrastructure and the impact 
such attacks have on a state’s security.  
Second, information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) are increasingly 
converging. While information technology includes the day-to-day use of software and 
hardware to communicate and transmit data, operational technology controls and 
monitors physical devices, such as power grids or dams. The general trend is that these 
physical devices, before operated by self-contained systems, increasingly use the same 
hardware and software as IT does. For example, power grids use information on people’s 
consumption and adjust their energy production accordingly.57  
To sum up, taking a specific dyad of states into consideration and keeping all other factors 
constant, the less digitalized state seems to have an advantage in cyberspace. In the 
offense-defense calculation, a more digitalized state must invest more into its cyber 
defense than a less digitalized state. Thus, digitalization seems to work opposite to 
territory. The more digitalized, the more offense gains the advantage. Less digitalized 
states reduce their margin of error as attackers have fewer opportunities to cause 
sophisticated damage to a state’s infrastructure. The degree of digitalization is linked to 
the dependency on ICT infrastructure. Highly digitalized states are less likely to be able 
to withstand a blow, as the damage on the state’s infrastructure would be high. Contrary, 
a less digitalized state is less dependent on the functioning of national networks that 
connect the servers of critical infrastructure. As digitalized states are more dependent on 
ICT’s, it can be expected that they develop the cyber capabilities that detect or prevent 
attacks from hostile servers. Therefore, with an increasing degree of digitalization, states 
should opt for an offensive cyber posture. 
                                                          
55 Coburn et al., ‘Cyber Risk Outlook 2018’, 15 
56 Ehrenfeld, ‘WannaCry, Cybersecurity and Health Information Technology’, 104 
57 This argument is brought up by Coden and Bartol, ‘Our critical infrastructure is more vulnerable than 
ever. It doesn’t have to be that way’ 
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Moreover, the digitalization variable can be considered an amplifier of the 
offense/defense posture. Depending on whether offense or defense has the advantage, it 
can be expected that digitalized states make careful considerations of which posture to 
adopt in order to maximize national security. Whether states with a higher degree of 
digitalization invest more in offensive cyber capabilities would be a logical consequence 
of the aforementioned reasons. A detailed analysis on offense/defense advantage follows 
in the next chapters.  
In addition to geography, technology is the second factor that determines the balance. 
Offense-defense theorists focus mainly on mobility and firepower when scrutinizing the 
impact of technology on the balance.58 There is a general agreement among scholars that 
mobility is more advantageous for the offense than for the defense. The argument is that 
weapons, which move more quickly and are more agile are able to break through 
defensive formations and may overcome the geographic advantage of the defender.59 In 
contrast, firepower tends to favor the defense for the opposite reasons. The argument is 
that defenders may stay camouflaged in secure positions while the attacker is more 
vulnerable due to troop movements.60  
The concepts of mobility and firepower need adjustments in order to apply them to the 
cyber domain. Saltzman suggests applying the concept of “versatility” instead of 
mobility, which “relates to the capacity to technologically attack different types of ICT-
based targets at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.”61 The more system 
networks of critical infrastructure a state is able to penetrate, the more advantages it has 
in a cyber conflict. When cyber weapons, in the form of malicious code, are considered 
as equivalent to traditional weapons, the ability to intrude into a variety of foreign 
networks applies better than the conventional mobility concept. In this regard, versatility 
seems to strengthen the offense advantage in cyberspace. 
Moreover, Saltzman suggests adjusting the concept of firepower to “byte power”. 
According to her, byte power “relates to the degree of technological damage that can be 
inflicted on the enemy’s ICT-based infrastructure at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
                                                          
58 See Lieber, ‘Grasping the Technological Peace’, 78 ibid. 
59 See Glaser and Kaufmann, ‘What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it?’, 62 
60 Ibid., 64 
61 Saltzman, ‘Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance’, 43 
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levels.”62 Intrusions alone do not influence the balance. To use malicious code effectively, 
states need to program it in such a way that it causes the desired damage. Byte power 
seems to be advantageous for the offense. Innovations in byte power, meaning the ability 
to exploit a vulnerability with high damage, by definition favor the offense. To use byte 
power for its own defense, the defending state must gain access to the attacker’s network, 
for which it requires offensive cyber capabilities. A further examination of offensive and 
defensive capabilities proceeds in the following chapters. 
The considerations of the offense-defense theory form the basis of the conceptualization 
of cyber posture that is used throughout this thesis. Cyber posture is composed of the two 
elements of capability and state doctrine. The thesis distinguishes between offensive and 
defensive cyber capabilities. Whereas defensive cyber capabilities refer to preemptive 
measures taken inside a state’s territory on national networks, offensive cyber capabilities 
means possessing malicious code that could attack foreign networks. Both elements will 
be discussed in the following chapter.  
While capabilities describe the means states possess in their arsenal, doctrine refers to 
how the state intends to use these means. In other words, capabilities mirror the resources 
that a state is able to convert into offensive or defensive military strength.63 This thesis 
assumes that states are rational actors, developing the capabilities, which fit best to their 
goal of maximizing security.64 Therefore, it can be assumed that states not only develop 
the capabilities that bring most use, but also adopt the posture that maximizes their 
security. The strategic advantage of capabilities is crucial for a state’s cyber posture. 
Lynn-Jones states that “when there is an offensive advantage, it means that available 
technologies make it less expensive for states to seek security by adopting offensive 
military postures and strategies.”65 Accordingly, when defense has the advantage, states 
invest in defensive capabilities and adopt a defensive posture.  
                                                          
62 Ibid., 44 
63 This argument is predominantly present in neorealist theories. See for example: Mearsheimer, 
‘Structural Realism’, 78 
64 Keohane, Neorealism and its critics, 7 
65 Lynn-Jones, ‘Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics’, 674–5 
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However, the offense-defense balance is merely an indicator that decision makers 
perceive.66 States cannot be entirely confident about the advantage of offensive or 
defensive capabilities. At this point, a state’s doctrine comes into play. States adopt their 
state posture according to how they perceive the offense-defense balance and formulate 
it in their doctrine.67 According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a 
doctrine is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in 
support of objectives.”68 Doctrines mirror the intentions on how states seek to use 
available capabilities and signal to others their military objectives. Accordingly, if the 
offense is believed to be in the advantage, states most likely adopt an offensive doctrine, 
whereas a defensive advantage suggests the adoption of a defensive doctrine. 
To sum up, this chapter first presented the classical offense-defense balance theory. 
Second, it translated the logic of the theory into the cyber domain. As geography and 
technology are crucial for the classical offense-defense balance, the chapter adjusted these 
factors to the cyber environment. While digitalization was theorized as the cyber-
equivalent to geography, byte power and versatility are used equivalent to technology. 
Accordingly, the offense-defense balance functions differently in the cyber domain. 
Whereas territorial size matters in the conventional domains, it does not play a role in 
cyberspace. Projected onto the variable of state size, small and large states are in the same 
manner vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Instead of territorial size, the degree of digitalization 
has a larger effect on the offense-defense balance in the virtual domain. Furthermore, 
whereas geography favors the defense in the conventional domains, digitalization favors 
the offense. Regarding technology, both byte power and versatility rather favor the 
offense in cyberspace equally to firepower and mobility in the conventional domains. 
These assumptions are summarized in the following table. 
 
 
                                                          
66 Van Evera, for instance, underlines the difference between the actual and the perceived offense-defense 
balance. See van Evera, ‘Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War’ 
67 Lynn-Jones, ‘Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics’, 671 
68 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’, 39 
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Table 1: Traditional vs. cyber: factors determining the offense-defense balance and 
their expected advantage 
Conventional domains Advantage Cyberspace Advantage 
Territory defense Digitalization offense 
Technology  Technology  
 Fire power defense  Byte power offense 
 Mobility offense  Versatility offense 
 
Before proceeding to a deeper literature-based discussion on the offense-defense 
advantage in cyberspace, the following two sub-chapters conceptualizes offensive and 
defensive cyber capabilities and elaborate their differences. Contrary to the conventional 
domain, where the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons is often blurred, 
the following illustrates that cyber weapons are clearer to differentiate than in the 
conventional domains. In theory, this makes the assessment easier and the security 
dilemma less acute. Furthermore, examining the technological opportunities in 
cyberspace helps to understand why a state opts for a certain cyber posture. 
 
2.2.2 Offensive cyber capabilities 
States with an offensive cyber posture actively develop cyber tools to intrude in a foreign 
network. To understand a state’s offensive cyber posture, this section examines offensive 
cyber capabilities and scrutinizes how these could be advantageous for states. In this 
context, two concepts must be distinguished: cyber-attack and cyber exploitation. Lin 
defines a cyber-attack as “ the use of deliberate actions and operations – perhaps over an 
extended period of time – to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary 
computer systems or networks or the information and (or) programs resident in or 
transiting these systems or networks.”69 Cyber-attacks are deployed for destructive 
purposes to damage another actor’s computer system. By contrast, cyber exploitation is 
“the use of actions and operations – perhaps over an extended period of time – to obtain 
information that would otherwise be kept confidential and is resident on or transiting 
                                                          
69 Lin, ‘Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force’, 63 
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through an adversary’s computer systems or networks.”70 Contrary to cyber-attacks, 
cyber exploitations do not pursue destruction as the main objective. The attacker attempts 
to intrude into a network with the smallest degree of intervention, but still enough to 
obtain useful information. Thereby, it is in the interests of the attacker to keep the 
intrusion unnoticed.71 
Both actions require the penetration of another network. In addition, when attacking or 
exploiting a network the intruder makes use of the same vulnerability in the system.72 
Therefore, it is difficult for the defender to differentiate whether the intrusion takes place 
to exploit information on a network server or to prepare an attack with a more damaging 
dimension. 
States have various options to intrude into foreign networks. To begin with, offensive 
cyber operations require vulnerabilities in the system of the adversary. Computer systems 
have weaknesses, which intruders exploit when penetrating a network. These weaknesses 
are valuable as long as the defender has not recognized and fixed it. After discovery of a 
vulnerability, the information is often made public and practitioners can update their 
systems and install patches to prevent an attack.73  
The penetration of a foreign computer system requires access to the network. If the target 
network is connected to the internet, the intruder may reach remote access from his own 
internet access point. However, states protect their critical infrastructure by creating a 
network that has no link to the internet. In this case, the infiltration of the computer device 
takes place either in the programming process of the software, or the intruder gains 
physical access to the network.74 
The intruder has different opportunities to penetrate a network and cause damage. Root 
attacks begin with an intrusion into a network by creating a normal user account. 
Attackers may additionally seek to gain authority over the network by exploiting system 
vulnerabilities.75 Furthermore, probing attacks entail the scanning of particular devices in 
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71 Ibid., 82 
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73 Ibid., 65 
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order to find system vulnerabilities. A common way to gain remote access to a network 
is to find zero-day exploits. Intruders seek to determine unknown weaknesses in the 
system software and penetrate the network using viruses, worms or related cyber 
capabilities.76 Furthermore, in a denial of service attack (DoS-attack), the attacker sends 
an enormous number of requests with invalid return addresses. The server waits for 
authentication approval, which it never receives. The number of requests overstrains the 
server and leads to server breakdowns.77 
Once the attacker places malicious code onto a foreign network, the intruder has the 
control of its activation. Either the intruder programmed the activation of the payload in 
advance or controls it from outside and activates it at any suitable time. The term payload 
describes the capacity malicious code can exert after placed in an adversary system. 
Depending on the infiltration code, the payload can be manifold in its damage. Intrusions 
may cause damage to data, cause the leak of confidential information or destroy a whole 
computer network. The objective is often not to destroy the network itself, but to influence 
the infrastructure that is connected and controlled by the network.78 These attacks have 
an indirect effect and are in the most cases not reversible. For instance, a malicious code 
may cause overheating of a machine or other electronic devices and trigger serious 
damage. Indirect effects of cyber-attacks are in most cases the main objective of an 
attacker.79 
Cyber-attacks reach their target in a short period. Malicious code may cause damage right 
after being send by the attacker. However, to deploy offensive cyber capabilities and 
intrude into networks of critical infrastructure, states need to start the operation a long 
time before it is needed. Launching offensive cyber operations requires preparation. 
States need time to develop new exploitation tools or discover zero-day vulnerabilities 
and develop tools that can exploit these vulnerabilities. Additionally, in many states the 
development and deployment of offensive cyber capabilities requires authorization from 
political and legal authorities. Therefore, despite the high speed at which an intrusion may 
take place, cyber operations still depend to a certain extent on human speed. People 
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require time, patience, discipline and advanced technological knowledge to launch cyber 
operations. Consequently, in order to be prepared for potential conflicts, states must 
develop cyber capabilities already in peaceful times.80 
 
2.2.3 Defensive cyber capabilities 
This section focuses on defensive cyber capabilities and describes the competencies a 
state may develop in order to protect its critical infrastructure from outside threats. The 
section distinguishes between two types of measures that include a defensive cyber 
posture. The first group of measures are passive defensive. States develop capabilities 
with the primarily focused on finding vulnerabilities in their own network. The other 
measure is active defense, in which states develop capabilities to penetrate foreign 
networks with the purpose of defending their own networks. 
In the literature, defensive cyber operations are often best practice guidelines for 
governments and organizations exploring what to do in order to make networks more 
secure. Therefore, this section provides an overview of passive defensive measures and 
dedicates more space to active defense, as it plays a greater role in the context of the 
offense-defense balance. To begin with, security practitioners share the view that an 
important component of cyber defense is knowing one’s own network. Rob Joyce, head 
of NSA’s Tailored Access Operations team, states that “if you really want to protect your 
network you have to know your network, including all the devices and technology in it.”81 
In addition, security practitioners offer a whole range of preemptive measures that can be 
deployed in order to protect networks. States may block or blacklist certain entities from 
sending mail to network servers in order to prevent malicious code.82 Moreover, keeping 
the software updated and installing regular patches to fix vulnerabilities in the system, 
ideally right after security companies release them, makes the system more secure. As is 
the case with the development of offensive cyber capabilities, defensive measures cost 
time and resources. Especially when the network connects critical infrastructure, updates 
must be proven in order not to reset important settings.83 Furthermore, monitoring user 
                                                          
80 See for example: Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma, 42 
81 Joyce, ‘USENIX Enigma 2016—NSA TAO Chief on Disrupting Nation State Hackers’ 
82 Ayala, Cybersecurity Lexicon, 41 
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accounts and deleting access and accounts of former employees reduces opportunities for 
intruders to penetrate a network.84  
Moreover, defensive cyber measures include the deployment of intrusion prevention 
systems, which detect suspicious activities and hinder them from reaching their target. 
Network security monitoring is the “collection, analysis and escalation of indications and 
warnings to detect and respond to intrusions.”85 Monitoring does not prevent attackers 
from entering the network, but rather hinders them from achieving their objectives. It has 
a clear defensive character. Due to the constant development of innovations, system 
firewalls are never completely secure. Technological innovations offer intruders new 
opportunities to penetrate a network. Network security monitoring prevents intruders 
from completing their mission and achieving their goals.86 It is often managed by 
computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) or computer emergency readiness 
teams (CERTs). A CERT is a “group of individuals usually consisting of Security 
Analysts organized to develop, recommend, and coordinate immediate mitigation actions 
for containment, eradication, and recovery resulting from computer security incidents.”87 
States invest in CERTs to be prepared for the moment when intruders attempt to penetrate 
their network. In recent years, collaboration between CERTs of different states has 
increased. Sharing information is of high value in the cyber domain. CERTs that 
identified a threat or system vulnerability share their knowledge with allied states to 
prevent damage or exploitation of their networks.88 The earlier a state knows about a 
vulnerability in its system, the less likely hostile intruders can use this system error to 
execute an attack. 
In contrast to passive defensive capabilities, active defense includes the intrusion into 
foreign networks in order to prevent the intruder from causing damage to the network. In 
the literature, there are different conceptualizations of the active defense concept, 
depending on whether it is applied to organizations and companies or to nation states.89 
According to Graham, “active defenses consist of electronic countermeasures that attack 
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88 An overview of the role of CERTs see: Skierka et al., ‘CSIRT Basics for Policy-Makers’ 
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an aggressive computer system, immobilizing that system and thus halting the cyber-
attack.”90 Active defense is used as a pre-emptive measure to prevent destructive cyber-
attacks. States attack hostile servers right after their networks have been penetrated. This 
concept plays a significant role in the discussion of offense-defense theory, as it blurs the 
distinction between offensive and defensive cyber posture. At this point, the dilemma of 
interpretation comes into play. States may develop offensive capabilities with defensive 
intentions. Defensive realism assumes that security-seeking states develop weapons for 
their own protection. However, how can a state know that a potential adversary is 
developing offensive weapons for active cyber defense and not for offensive attacks?91 
Active defense requires the same offensive capabilities that are necessary when intruding 
into foreign networks with offensive intentions. Thus, states possessing offensive 
capabilities are already potential aggressors.  
Another aspect that deserves consideration is that “fully maximizing network security 
necessitates intrusion into the networks of other actors.”92 By intruding into foreign 
networks, states gather information they need to protect their own network and prevent 
potential attacks. These defensive-minded intrusions are only feasible because of the 
possibility to conduct operations that are covert and difficult to attribute. In the 
conventional domains, placing military forces on adversary’s territory would obviously 
violate a state’s sovereignty and causes conflict. Even an invasion for defensive purposes 
would most likely result in an escalation.93 
Finally, active defense in the sense of “hacking back” could hit innocent actors whose 
device has been abused. Hostile states can launch their attack from devices that are located 
in a third country. An accurate investigation that guarantees reliable evidence would be 
time-consuming and expensive.94 Therefore, Jeffrey Carr underlines that “technological 
limitations will place states in a position where a timely decision to use active defenses 
requires states to decide to use them with imperfect knowledge.”95 
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To sum up, a crucial part of the conceptualization of offense/defense cyber posture is 
whether states develop offensive or defensive cyber capabilities. The two sub-chapters 
examined the differences between offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. While 
cyber weapons are clearer distinguishable than conventional weapons in the traditional 
domains, the intentions of their use are blurred. Those states having the technical skills to 
conduct a cyber-attack can use them, whether for offensive or defensive purposes. 
Therefore, active defense defined as the ability to hack-back after becoming victim of an 
intrusion is considered as an offensive capability in the technical sense. However, the 
intentions of a state matter. Thus, the state’s doctrine and cyber strategy, the second 
component of cyber posture, provides insight into how and under which circumstances 
offensive cyber capabilities can be deployed.  
The previous two sub-chapters elaborated the question of the offense-defense theory, 
namely whether offensive and defensive weapons are distinguishable. The next chapter 
is devoted to the question of whether the offense or the defense has the advantage in 
cyberspace. A literature-based comparison of different assumptions illustrates that 
answering this question is by no means simple.  
 
2.2.4 Discussing offense-defense cyber advantage 
This thesis argues that the offense-defense balance variable is a crucial factor that may 
have great influence on a state’s cyber posture. If offense or defense is in the advantage, 
states are likely to opt for it in order to maximize their security. Structural realists mainly 
use the offense-defense balance in order to understand the outbreak of wars and conflict.96 
The following section scrutinizes the advantages of offensive and defensive capabilities 
not with the aim to understand when conflict in cyberspace is more likely, but rather to 
understand the reasons behind a states offensive/defensive cyber posture. In other words, 
the cyber offense-defense balance is used as a variable to explain cyber posture rather 
than conflict. Whether an offensive cyber posture leads to conflict is a different question 
that is not elaborated in this research. Certainly, the offense-defense balance is not the 
only variable that explains posture. However, under the assumption that states act 
rationally, it can be expected that they mirror the offense-defense balance in their posture. 
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In the literature, most of the scholars, journalists and security practitioners argue in favor 
of an offense advantage in cyberspace.97 Many assessments focus on the technological 
component of cyberspace. Joseph Nye, for instance, highlights that “the internet was 
designed for ease of use rather than security, [and therefore] the offense currently has the 
advantage over the defense.”98 However, he adds that this advantage can change when 
cyber security systems become stronger.99 Lieberthal and Singer argue in the same vein. 
To their mind, most systems and products were programmed to facilitate the flow of 
information rather than focusing on security issues. Additionally, they point out that in 
order to patch vulnerabilities and update systems, defenders rely on intruders who seek 
to penetrate their network. Only then can defenders investigate and fix system 
vulnerabilities.100 
In line with the majority view, this thesis argues that offense has the advantage in 
cyberspace. This would suggest that states as rational actors rather invest in offensive 
cyber capabilities. However, to contrast this consideration, the following section delivers 
arguments for the opposite. The aim is to illustrate that the offense-defense balance in 
cyberspace faces the same problem of defining the offense/defense advantage as in the 
traditional domains. 
A smaller group of authors challenges the assumption of an offense-dominated 
cyberspace.101 Firstly, they criticize the absence of empirical evidence that proves the 
offensive advantage. Furthermore, when evaluating the offense-defense balance, 
adherents of the defensive advantage often include more than only the technological 
component into their assessment.  
Their theoretical arguments are often based on a cost-benefit analysis and highlight the 
enormous cost of an offensive cyber operation. Monte, for instance, indicates that 
“breaking into a particular network may be cheap after the tools and infrastructure are in 
place,” but “building and maintaining the infrastructure for a program of sustained 
operations requires targeting, research, hardware engineering, software development, and 
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training.”102 The costs occur in the preparation process. There is no empirical evidence 
that the cost-benefit ratio of financial resources and offensive capabilities is lower than 
the ratio of financial recourses and defensive capabilities.  
Rid, for instance, highlights three reasons why the offense does not necessarily have the 
advantage in cyber conflict. Firstly, he points out that “the better the protective and 
defensive setup of complex systems, the more sophistication, the more resources, the 
more skills, the more specificity in design, and the more organization is required from the 
attacker.”103 Secondly, he notes that offensive cyber capabilities are often programmed 
for a specific vulnerability in target system. A repeated application of the same code is 
unlikely, as other system have different configurations. Moreover, once the defender 
patched the vulnerable entry point, the code seems to be useless.104 Accordingly, Gartzke 
remarks that cyber-attacks are “use and lose” capabilities.105 Thirdly, an increasing 
number of security companies attempt to find system vulnerabilities, which increases the 
difficulty to find entry points. During the last years, the public and private sector 
recognized the threat that endangers their digital infrastructure and hire security 
companies to secure their networks. The more security companies attempt to identify 
vulnerabilities, the more difficult it becomes for attackers to intrude a network.106  
Additionally, Richard Clarke, a former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 
Protection and Counter-terrorism for the United States, develops the argument to invest 
first in cyber defense before focusing in the offense. To his mind, a credible defense 
strategy is necessary to protect its critical infrastructure in the first place. Developing a 
strike-first strategy, which includes the immediate destruction of threats, is complicated 
in cyberspace, as the threat can come from every server in the world.107 Moreover, Clarke 
highlights that defenders do not simply identify the vulnerability once they became victim 
of a cyber exploit. They also analyze the malicious code and program patches to become 
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resistant for future attacks. Although updating all systems is costly and burdensome, 
states at least patch their critical infrastructure, which defuses the potential of the threat.108  
A comparison of different views on offense/defense cyber dominance demonstrates that 
even though most of the scholars assume an offense advantage, the debate is by no means 
settled. When it is difficult to determine whether offense or defense is advantageous in 
cyberspace, can the offense-defense balance serve as a suitable variable to explain cyber 
posture? This thesis argues that it can. States not only adopt an offensive/defensive cyber 
posture according to what the actual offense-defense balance indicates, but rather adjust 
their posture according to what they perceive as being advantageous. In other words, in 
the frame of the theory, when all states are similarly rational actors and perceive an 
offensive advantage in cyberspace, all states would deploy offensive capabilities and 
adopt an offensive cyber posture to maximize their security. On the contrary, when states 
perceive an advantage on the defense, they would accordingly focus on defensive 
capabilities and opt for a defensive posture in cyberspace. Admittedly, this radical 
theoretical conclusion does not necessarily reflect empirically observable behavior at all 
time, as states are not always rational actor and other factors could influence a state’s 
cyber posture. However, in line with neorealist assumptions and following the majority 
view of an offensive advantage in cyberspace, it can be expected that states adopt an 
offensive cyber posture. 
Furthermore, offense or defense cyber posture must be understood as a tendency rather 
than an either/or choice. To secure itself from cyber threats, every state needs defensive 
cyber capabilities. Without having network protection in place, states are exposed to a 
much larger number of threat actors. When network systems are not secure, even attackers 
with limited knowledge are able to intrude critical networks and cause danger to a state’s 
infrastructure. On the other hand, every state possesses a certain amount of offensive 
cyber capabilities. As discussed above, offensive cyber capabilities involve merely 
possessing the knowledge to intrude into foreign network systems to place malicious code 
that could cause harm to a state’s critical infrastructure. When deploying defensive 
measures (e.g. network monitoring), states gain knowledge of vulnerabilities, which 
could be used for their advantage to attack other systems, in which the entry point has not 
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been patched. Therefore, cyber posture includes not only the offensive or defensive 
capabilities a state possesses in its arsenal, but also doctrine, namely the declaration in 
which it expresses the intention to make use of these capabilities. Consequently, states 
with an offensive cyber posture develop offensive cyber capabilities and formulate in 
their doctrine under which conditions they seek to use them. Contrary, states with a 
defensive posture invest their financial resources in defensive cyber capabilities and 
accordingly disclose it in their doctrine. 
Moreover, the variation in posture raises the question of whether state size makes a 
difference in cyber posture. During the last years, journalists have extensively published 
incidents of state-to-state cyber-attacks, in which mostly powerful states, such as the 
USA, China and Russia are in focus.109 Is the development of offensive capabilities a 
trend of great powers to increase their influence in world politics or are small states 
likewise involved in this trend? Is cyber offense-defense theory helpful to understand 
cyber posture of small states? Conventional offense-defense theory does not make 
distinction between small and large, but predominantly focuses on powerful states. 
The following chapter scrutinizes small state’s security characteristics and discusses them 
in light of the offense-defense theory. The identified factors that influence the cyber 
offense-defense balance, namely the degree of digitalization and technology 
characterized as versatility and byte power, form the basis of the analysis. The chapter 
scrutinizes how state size features matter for these factors and whether they make a 
difference in cyber posture. 
 
 
2.3 Small states and the offense-defense balance in cyberspace 
 
This chapter examines how features that determine the offense-defense balance effect 
small states in cyberspace. First, the chapter outlines the approach used for this thesis to 
differentiate between large and small states. Next, it discusses key characteristics of the 
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security behaviour of small states in the traditional domains and theorizes them in 
cyberspace. The aim of this section is to outline a conceptual framework in order to 
explain small state’s cyber posture and give answer to the main question of how state size 
shapes cyber posture of states. 
International Relations literature provides wide range of approaches on how to group 
states according to their size. The variety of approaches, reaching from quantitative, 
qualitative, relational and self-perceptional attempts to categorize state size, points to the 
complexity of applying this concept and inferring sophisticated hypotheses. However, a 
deeper discussion on how to differentiate between small and large goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis. In accordance with neorealist theory, it is sufficient to focus on material 
characteristics and define smallness in absolute terms using quantitative criteria. 
Accordingly, and in line with the offense-defense theory, the conceptualization of state 
size used in this thesis rests on a structural realist approach. 
To begin with, attempts at conceptualizing state size in absolute terms often include the 
following criteria: size of the territory, population size, economic activity, and the level 
of military capacity.110 Even though these criteria seem clear and easy applicable, it 
remains a matter of debate to what extent a state needs to fulfill the criteria in order be 
regarded as small or large.111 However, it seems reasonable that structural realists 
conceptualize state size in terms of power. The elusive concept of power encompasses 
the ability of states to shape the outcome of international events. While large states have 
a great influence on international decision-making, small states are rather objects of great 
power politics than active subjects reliant on great power politics. To operationalize 
power, the approach typically includes countable scales such as the number of weapons, 
soldiers or the total gross domestic product (GDP) to determine the economic strength of 
a state.112 
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Following from the conceptual distinction between small and large states, the literature 
illustrates the challenges that small states face.113 The following section points out these 
challenges and critically examines smallness against the background of the offense-
defense theory. First, the primary goal of survival is more acute for small states than for 
larger powers. In an anarchic international system, small states constantly need to adjust 
their security strategy according to the decisions of larger powers.114 Furthermore, small 
states have a smaller “margin of error” when organizing their national security strategy. 
While large states do not directly risk their survival when testing security strategies, 
wrong security decisions may have existence-threatening effects on small states.115 
Regarding state posturing, the small margin of error and financial constraints suggest that 
small states are more sensitive to the offense-defense balance. Small states need to take 
wise decisions on their posture, as mistakes can have a much higher impact. For posturing 
one could therefore expect that small states’ postures correspond more closely to the 
offense-defense balance. 
Second, small states react instead of shaping the structure of the international system. The 
asymmetric distribution of power reduces opportunities to gain security goals using 
military means. Entering into conflict with a powerful adversary may have existentially 
threatening consequences. In this vein, Mearsheimer theorizes that “the bigger the gap in 
power between any two states, the less likely it is that the weaker will attack the 
stronger”.116 Accordingly, Glaser and Kaufmann consider asymmetric power differences 
when outlining the offense-defense balance. On the one hand, small states may overcome 
the size disparity when the defensive advantage of the balance is large. The security of a 
state increases with the advantage of the defense. In other words, aggressors may need to 
invest multiple times more into the offense in order to overcome the defensive advantage. 
On the other hand, the power disparity of states can be so different that “even if defense 
has a large advantage, a much wealthier attacker might still be able to outspend a defender 
by a sufficient margin to gain an effective offensive capability.”117 To conclude, the 
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assumptions suggest that small states rather opt for a defensive security posture, 
especially when the advantage of offense/defense is not clearly visible. 
Having said that, how do conventional offense-defense factors influence small states? 
Regarding geography and technology, both factors apply in the same way for small and 
large states. However, a brief illustration of how these factors affect small states is 
necessary in order to examine the same logic in the cyber domain. First, in conventional 
offense-defense theory, geography gives advantage to the defense. In the same way as 
large states, small states on islands or surrounded by mountains are more secure than 
others are. Thus, the geographic factor has the same defensive effect on both small and 
large states. Accordingly, when geographic obstacles give an advantage to their security, 
small states are expected to opt for a defensive posture.118 
Second, as illustrated above, technology in terms of mobility and firepower gives 
advantage to both offense and defense. The development of military technology is an 
investment in capabilities. Small states lack the resources to invest in the newest military 
capabilities. Depending on whether offense or defense has the advantage, small states 
seek to maximize their security with the lowest costs and highest benefits and adopt their 
posture accordingly. In this regard, the technology variable has a similar effect on both 
small and large states.  
The application of the offense-defense balance to small states must be considered with 
caution. The theoretical assumptions indicate that the variables can be applied to small 
states in the same manner as to large states. This raises the question of whether it is useful 
to distinguish between small and large when applying the offense-defense balance. 
Certainly, it makes sense when looking at the balance in general. Small states are more 
sensitive to the offense-defense balance and therefore have not much leeway when 
determining their posture. The reasons are not the factors of the offense-defense balance, 
but rather the size of the state itself. 
Moreover, even though the advantage is on the offense, small states need to overcome the 
power asymmetry to their potential aggressors. Would a small state attack another state 
in order to increase its security? An explanation for a small state’s offensive posture could 
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be that small states attack in order to pre-empt or to deter potential invaders. However, 
using this mean of last resort would imply that the small state has already given up its 
primary goal of survival. These abstract considerations concern a state dyad with 
asymmetric power distribution. When the dyad consists of two states of the same size, the 
offense-defense balance seems to have a greater impact on state posture, as rather factors 
such as technology and geography play a role instead of unequal distribution of power. 
To conclude, the asymmetric distribution of power seems to supplant the offense-defense 
balance variable in terms of explaining state posture.  
These conventional assumptions of the small state literature illustrate the general 
argument that small states act differently than large states.119 The following section 
examines whether the unique characteristics of cyberspace makes small states behave like 
large states regarding their cyber posture, or in any case differently from what the 
conventional small state’s literature assumes. Trying to establish the cyber posture of 
small states, the aim of this section is to connect the tendencies of small state security 
policy to offense-defense theory and question why states opt for an offensive/defensive 
posture. What kind of behavior is to be expected when thinking about the security of small 
states regarding their offensive and defensive capabilities?  
Overall, the thesis argues that the logic of a cyber offense-defense balance applies in the 
same manner to small states. First, when it comes to the sensitivity of small states towards 
the offense-defense balance, it can be expected that small state’s cyber posture mirror 
more closely the offense-defense balance, as they face the pressure of recourse constraints 
and margin of error similarly in the cyber and the traditional domain.  
Second, as theorized in the previous sections, the factor of digitalization applies in the 
same manner to small and large states. In contrast to the traditional domain, where 
geography rather favours the defense, in the digital domain small and large states are in 
the same way vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Small and large states choose the degree of 
digitalization by themselves and can adjust their cyber posture accordingly. Therefore, 
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the degree of digitalization does not seem to indicate a difference in small or large states 
cyber posture. 
Third, it can be even expected that small states use the cyber domain to balance their 
structural disadvantage of being small. Areng, for instance, argues that small states may 
increase their influence in the international arena developing “cyber power”. The 
development of information and communication technology requires qualitative 
personnel instead of quantitative military forces, which give advantage to small states and 
make warfare more equally. In this regard, Areng notes that “cyber means are planned 
and used as an effective force multiplier, an enhancement for traditional means or as a 
stand-alone capability that can give substantial asymmetric advantage to states that are 
considered weaker in terms of traditional combat power.”120 
When theorizing the offense-defense balance in cyberspace on small states, the 
illustrations above indicate that the factors determining the balance apply in the same 
manner to small and large states. Accordingly, when the majority suggests an offensive 
advantage in cyberspace, it can be expected that small states similarly adopt an offensive 
posture in cyberspace. However, these considerations are vague and reflect only the 
behaviour of small states in the offense-defense discussion. In the previous chapter, the 
debate on whether offense or defense has the advantage in cyberspace underlined that 
even though the majority of authors assume an offensive advantage, the issue is by far 
not clear.  
In a small-large comparison, this research assumes that powerful states still mirror the 
offense-defense balance, but can afford to ignore it to a certain extent for the following 
reasons. First, they are by definition wealthier and can afford the development of 
offensive capabilities that may increase their security. Adopting an offensive cyber 
posture makes sure that they are on the safe side to protect their critical infrastructure. 
Consequently, possessing financial resources suggests that large states are less reliant on 
the offense-defense balance. Even without having a clear picture of what the offense-
defense balance suggests to adopt, large states have the resources to invest in both 
capabilities.  
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Second, large states pursue different aims and ambitions. While survival is still their 
primary goal, they also aim security through hegemony. States compete with each other 
in gaining ultimate power. Mearsheimer argues that “the desire for more power does not 
go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony”121. To achieve this aim, 
large states require offensive cyber capabilities not only for the purpose of defending, but 
also for gaining superiority in the cyber domain. This underlines the expectation that 
powerful states rather opt for an offensive cyber posture. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the majority of an offensive advantage in cyberspace, 
small states are expected to adopt an offensive cyber posture. The factors determining the 
balance apply to small states in the same manner as to larger powers. Small states might 
even become more active regarding the development of offensive cyber capabilities in 
order to decrease their asymmetric security advantage. These assumptions suggest that 
that the effect of state size is low. It is expected that small and large states act similarly 
in the cyber domain. The next chapters test these assumptions empirically.  
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3 Methodology 
 
The previous chapters theorized state posture in the traditional and cyber domain against 
the background of the offense-defense theory. In terms of method, the empirical part 
makes use of a comparative analysis of two cases, the United Kingdom and the Estonian 
Republic. The research employs a most similar systems design (MSSD) to scrutinize how 
state size influences the cyber posture of states.122 
Cyber posture is the dependent variable of this thesis. The variable is dichotomous taking 
the value offensive or defensive. The offensive or defensive nature of a state’s cyber 
posture is established by analyzing the character of (a) doctrine, and (b) capabilities. A 
posture is considered offensive, when the doctrine emphasizes the intentions to deploy 
offensive code to intrude into foreign networks and when the state possesses offensive 
capabilities to carry out such offensive operations. In contrast, a posture is considered 
defensive when the doctrine highlights only measures that focus on the security of 
national networks rather intruding into foreign systems.  
To determine the offensive or defensive posture of a state regarding its doctrine, this 
research analysis cyber security strategies, annual security reviews, public speeches by 
security officials, and statements published by governmental institutions with the aim to 
identify terminology reflecting offensive or defensive thinking. For example, when 
“offensive capabilities” or “ability to attack first” is referred to with the intention to 
intrude into foreign networks, the thesis assumes that a state adopts an offensive posture. 
In contrast, the terms “network management”, “updating systems” and “analyzing cyber 
threats”, which refers to actions taking place only inside national networks, are presumed 
to suggest the cyber posture to be rather defensive. While it is difficult to quantify the 
precise degree of offensive and defensive posturing, the analysis of the cyber doctrines is 
sufficient to establish the overall character of a state’s cyber posture.  
In addition to doctrine, the thesis assesses the capabilities that a state is able to deploy. 
To complement doctrine, capabilities indicate what the state is actually capable of doing. 
An offensive doctrine alone is not yet an offensive posture. Doctrine needs to be 
underpinned with matching capabilities. In order to measure whether a state has offensive 
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cyber capabilities, the thesis identifies (a) whether offensive measures are part of 
repertoire of state and (b) whether a state outlines scenarios for offensive deployment. 
Regarding sources, establishing the presence of offensive cyber capabilities represents a 
challenge. Most of the information is confidential and kept in secret for the public, this 
thesis relies on cyber security reviews, official statements and the budget that has been 
spend for cyber security purposes in order to identify the nature of capabilities a state 
develops. Even though the sources do not allow for precise measurement, they are 
sufficient for this thesis to establish the presence or absence of offensive capabilities. 
The independent variable of this thesis is state size. Being aware of the conceptual 
challenge to differentiate between small and large states (see chapter 2.3) this thesis 
nevertheless defines state size as a dichotomous variable. Accordingly, states are 
classified as being small or large. In order to measure state size, the thesis relies on the 
neorealist approach, which takes the size of territory, population size, economic strength, 
and the level of military capacity into account.123 This thesis operationalizes state size 
relying on the data of the World Bank country profiles124 and the Military Expenditure 
Database created by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute.125 
The UK is with a population of over 66 million the third biggest country in the European 
Union and belongs to the 25 population riches countries in the world.126 Even though the 
UK is in a global comparison relatively small regarding its territorial size, it has political 
and economic influence all over the world due to its colonial legacy. In addition, the UK 
is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and in the group of the 
seven largest economies in the world (G7). With a nominal GDP of more than USD 2.6 
trillion (nominal)127, the UK belongs economically to the most powerful states in the 
world. Furthermore, the UK had an annual military expenditure of 47 billion dollar in 
2017128, which the second highest in the European Union after France. At least in a 
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regional scale, the figures illustrate that the United Kingdom can be considered as a large 
state. 
In contrast, the Estonian Republic belongs to the group of the smallest states in the world. 
With a population of slightly above 1.3 million, Estonia is the fourth smallest country in 
the European Union after Malta, Luxembourg and Cyprus.129 Estonia has a GDP of almost 
USD 26 billion (nominal), which is among the smallest economies in the European 
Union.130 Finally, the military expenditure of Estonia was slightly above 536.3 million, 
which was more than 2 percent of the GDP, but still among the lowest in the European 
Union.131 This qualifies Estonia being a small state.  
As Gerring describes for MSSD, “the chosen pair of cases is similar in all respects except 
the variable(s) of interest”132, in this case state size. Other potentially relevant factors are 
regime type, alliance membership, the degree of digitalization including e-infrastructure 
dependency, information and communication technology development and the level of 
cybersecurity. These factors are comparable in both cases. For example, regarding regime 
type, both are full democratic states133, members of the European Union, and members of 
NATO.  
Important with regard to cyber posturing, both states are on a similar level of 
digitalization. To operationalize the broad concept of digitalization and the level of e-
infrastructure dependency, the thesis includes the e-Governance Index published by the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations.134 The index is 
composed of the Telecommunication and Infrastructure Index, the Human Capital Index 
and the Online-Service Index. It indicates the preparedness of government institutions to 
offer public services using ICTs. As theorized in the previous part, the thesis assumes that 
an increase in the degree of digitalization rises the dependency on ICTs and makes society 
more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
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Estonia offers a whole range of public services to its citizens, which include digital 
identification and signing of documents, electronic tax declaration, online medical 
prescriptions and internet voting. Ninety-nine percent of the public services are available 
online. The decentralized Estonian information system (X-Road), connecting government 
authorities and companies with each other, guarantees a secure and fast exchange of data 
saving labor and time and creates transparency in the relation between state and citizen.135  
In the same way, the United Kingdom is among the leading countries delivering public 
online services to its citizens. Since 2012, the online platform gov.uk is the countries 
single point of access to online services and combines services from all government 
authorities. Currently, UK citizens can obtain 780 public services online.136 The figures 
in table 2 illustrates that both states are very highly committed to offering public services 
using ICTs.  
Table 2: E-Government Development Index (EGDI) 2018137 
 EDGI EGDI-rank EGDI-level138 
United Kingdom 0.8999 4 Very high 
Estonian Republic 0.8486 16 Very high 
 
The concept of information technology development describes the progress of a society 
in developing and adopting ICTs. Online public services increase dependency on e-
government structures and the cyber domain in general. This thesis utilizes figures from 
the ICT Development Index139 to demonstrate the similarity of the two cases. The index 
is composed of three indicators: ICT infrastructure and access, ICT usage and ICT skills 
and includes indicators such as the proportion of households with internet access, 
proportion of people using the internet and education parameters.140 In various aspects, 
the indicators are similar to the e-Government Index. However, as the figures are merely 
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considered to show similarities between the two cases regarding their advanced stage in 
adopting ICTs, there is no need for a more detailed analysis of the parameters.  
Table 3 illustrates the advancement of the UK and Estonia in the field of ICT-
development. Both belong to the group of the 15 most advanced states in the world, 
measured by fixed and mobile telephone subscriptions, international internet bandwidth 
and percentage of households with computer and internet access.141 
Table 3: ICT-Development Index (IDI) 2017142 
 IDI value IDI rank 
United Kingdom 8.65 5 
Estonian Republic 8.14 14 
 
Finally, the study includes the level of cyber security in order to examine the commitment 
to cybersecurity of both cases. By doing this, it includes the Global Cybersecurity Index 
(GCI)143, which measures the engagement on cybersecurity in the following five pillars: 
legal, technical, organizational, capacity building and cooperation. Accordingly, it 
classifies states into three GCI tiers: initiating, maturing and leading. The index does not 
provide answers to the level of security of a specific state, but captures how well 
positioned states are regarding their cyber security. 
Both the UK and Estonia are highly committed to improving their cyber security 
regarding organizational coordination and policy structure, technical security support, 
existence of legal structures, capacity building and cooperation and information sharing. 
In the ranking of all 192 UN member states, the UK and Estonia are ranked among the 
highest. 
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Table 4: Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2017144 
 GCI score GCI rank 
United Kingdom 0.783 12 
Estonian Republic 0.846 5 
 
To conclude, the illustrations above demonstrate that while the UK and Estonia are 
different in size, both are otherwise similar with regard to a range of potentially relevant 
features such e-government, ICT development and commitment to cyber security. The 
following section focuses on the cyber posture of both states separately before comparing 
both in a detail. 
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4 Comparing the cyber posture of a large and a small state 
 
The following part of this thesis assesses whether difference in state size is reflected in 
the cyber posture of state. First, the following sub-chapters scrutinize doctrine and 
capabilities of the United Kingdom and Estonia. The aim is to identify the overall cyber 
posture in order to assess whether the empirical evidence coincides with the theoretical 
assumptions stated in the previous part. 
 
4.1 Cyber Posture of the United Kingdom 
 
4.1.1 Cyber doctrine 
Every five years the British government publishes an updated National Cyber Security 
Strategy, in which they outline their approach to cyber security and how to tackle cyber-
related risks.145 These papers not only highlight priorities and values regarding UK’s 
behavior in the cyber domain but also formulate the aims and ambitions to achieve the 
goal of securing individuals, companies and government institutions. The following 
section reflects the first two cyber security strategies by focusing on the UK’s stance 
regarding the deployment of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Next, this section 
scrutinizes the most recent cyber security strategy in order to determine whether the 
offensive/defensive tendency of the previous strategies has been carried over to the most 
recent one and whether the UK cyber posture can therefore be considered offensive or 
defensive in terms of doctrine.  
In June 2009, the United Kingdom published its first cyber security strategy. The 
government recognized the significance of the cyber domain for individuals, companies 
and government institutions and therefore published the Cyber Security Strategy as an 
addition to the existing National Security Strategy.146 The paper provides a general 
overview of how UK understands cyberspace and identifies the threatening actors. Beside 
criminals and terrorists, states are regarded as “the most sophisticated threat in the cyber 
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domain”147 due to their ability “to exploit computers and communications networks to 
gather intelligence on government, military, industrial and economic targets, and 
opponents of their regimes”148. Furthermore, the strategy points out UK’s aims to use the 
cyber domain for their advantage in the fight against criminals, terrorists, and in military 
conflicts. Even though the strategy does not name the deployment of offensive cyber 
capabilities, taking the advantage entails to “cover the full range of possible actions that 
the UK might need to take (…) in order to support cyber security and wider national 
security policy aims.”149 In this regard, to “intervene against advisories”150 is an explicit 
action that the strategy mentions. 
In this sense, the UK acknowledges “the need to develop military and civil capabilities, 
both nationally and with allies, to ensure we [the British government] can defend against 
attack, and take steps against adversaries where necessary.”151 An indication of what 
entails these steps are not further elaborated. However, the strategy reveals that the UK 
seeks to become a powerful player in the cyber domain by using the advantages of cyber 
capabilities also for strategic warfare. Thus, cyber capabilities are not strictly for 
defensive purposes alone. The UK seems to reserve the right to use these tools to pursue 
its wider strategic aims.  
Two years later, in November 2011, the UK published the second National Cyber Security 
Strategy (NCSS 2011), which entails a more detailed view on how the government seeks 
to secure the cyber domain.152 The strategy determines a whole range of cyber threats and 
outlines how to approach these. The measures used in order to defend critical 
infrastructure are rather defensive. For instance, the government attempts to “improve 
(…) detection and analysis of sophisticated cyber threats”153, “enhance (…) capability to 
defend against and deter high-end, state-sponsored threats”154 and “exchange information 
with the private sector on the risks emerging from cyberspace”155. However, at one point 
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the government states to “take a more proactive approach to tackling cyber threats”156. 
Whether the proactive approach includes the deployment of offensive capabilities 
remains unclear. The strategy only indicates that the (Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) “(…) has some world-class skills at its disposal”157, which relate 
to the espionage capabilities of the British agency rather than efforts to take an offensive 
stance in cyberspace. 
Crucial for this thesis is the Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021, which reflects the most 
recent plans and developments in how the UK copes with cyber threats. Overall, the 
strategy outlines a range of defensive measures in order to ensure the security of national 
networks, which suggest that the UK invests predominantly in defensive cyber 
capabilities. However, the strategy highlights the government’s plans to adopt an Active 
Cyber Defense (ACD) program. According to the strategy, active defense is defined as 
the “principle of implementing security measures to strengthen a network or system to 
make it more robust against attack”158. The named security measures include “tackling 
phishing, blocking malicious domains and IP addresses, and other steps to disrupt 
malware attacks”159. As most of the UK critical infrastructure is owned by the private 
sector, the British government seeks to work close together with the industry and help 
them to protect machine software.160  
Active cyber defense seems to include measures only within the boundaries of the UK’s 
national networks. Thus, conceptualization of the term active defensive is not identical to 
what was theorized in the section of offensive cyber capabilities (chapter 2.2.2). In the 
academic debate, active defense refers to the intrusion into foreign networks in order to 
prevent the intruder from causing damage to one’s own network infrastructure.161 
Looking at the conceptualization of the concept in the strategy, there is no indication that 
active defense involves the penetration of foreign networks. Ian Levy, Technical Director 
in the UK National Cyber Security Centre, even states that the ACD program “is not 
intended to imply retaliation (`hack back') by victims or militarisation of the internet 
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(…)”162. The program rather “aspires to protect the majority of people in the UK from the 
majority of the harm, caused by the majority of the attacks, for the majority of the 
time.”163 What does this mean for the UK’s cyber posture? The ACD program underlines 
the UK’s focus on the defense. Even though the term active defense may suggest actions 
that go beyond the protection of national networks, UK uses the concept for clearly 
defensive purposes.  
Apart from the whole range of defensive cyber measures that the UK adopts within the 
Active Cyber Defense program, the NCSS 2016-2021 makes clear indications that the 
UK’s defense includes offensive cyber elements.164 While the British understanding of 
active cyber defense is defensive in nature, deploying offensive cyber capabilities seems 
to encompass attacks on systems located outside the UK’s territory. The NCSS 2016-
2021 conceptualizes offensive cyber capabilities as “the use of cyber capabilities to 
disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy computers networks and internet connected devices.”165 
Regarding the development of offensive cyber capabilities, the strategy leaves little room 
for interpretation. The paper states: 
“Offensive cyber capabilities involve deliberate intrusions into opponents’ systems 
or networks, with the intention of causing damage, disruption or destruction. 
Offensive cyber forms part of the full spectrum of capabilities we will develop to 
deter adversaries and to deny them opportunities to attack us, in both cyberspace and 
the physical sphere.”166 
According to the strategy, the government seeks to deploy offensive cyber capabilities 
“at a time and place of our [the UK’s] choosing, for both deterrence and operational 
purposes”167. The paper underlines that the UK “respond(s) to cyber attacks in the same 
way as we [the UK] respond to any other attack, using whichever capability is most 
appropriate, including an offensive cyber capability”168 and integrates these capabilities 
into the arsenal of the armed forces.169 The use of offensive cyber capabilities does not 
seem to enrich the methods of the secret service alone, but also contributes to the UK’s 
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military power in conflicts. Close cooperation between the GCHQ and the Ministry of 
Defense in the field of cyber security in the framework of a National Offensive Cyber 
Programme (NOCP) has been in place since 2015.170 
The UK’s approach to develop and make use of offensive cyber capabilities is reflected 
in speeches and statements by cyber security officials. Some month before the NCSS 
2016-2021 was published, George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer from 2010-
2016, underlined in his November 2015 speech that “we [the UK] are building our own 
offensive cyber capability – a dedicated ability to counter-attack in cyberspace.”171 
Osborne emphasizes the UK’s wide range of tools to cyber threats when possessing 
offensive cyber capabilities, which increases the level of security. Others supported this 
view and argued in the same vein. Ciaran Martin, Chief Executive of the National Cyber 
Security Center, points out that the UK deploys offensive cyber measures “to combat and 
deter the most aggressive threats”172 
The analysis of the UK’s cyber doctrine through the prism of offense/defense posture 
points out that the UK’s cyber defense includes offensive components. In other words, 
the UK develops offensive tools in addition to their defensive capabilities. The most 
recent cyber security strategy as well as political statements indicate that UK does not 
only establish an offensive cyber force, but is also willing to use it in case of hostile cyber-
attacks on national networks and for operations to strengthen its military power. 
 
4.1.2 Cyber capabilities 
The previous section scrutinized the National Cyber Security Strategies and examined 
statements in order to illustrate the place of cyber capabilities in the UK’s doctrinal 
thinking. However, as discussed in the theoretical part, this thesis defines cyber posture 
as comprising the components doctrine and capabilities. The following section scrutinizes 
UK’s cyber capabilities to understand whether the UK possesses the capabilities to carry 
out offensive actions as described in its doctrine. 
                                                          
170 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts, 26 
171 Osborne, Chancellor's speech to GCHQ on cyber security 
172 Martin, A new approach for cyber security in the UK 
 47 
 
Firstly, this section attempts to identify the offensive and defensive cyber capabilities that 
the UK possesses in its defense arsenal. The aim is to gain an impression of the current 
state of affairs and evaluate whether offensive or defensive capabilities predominate. 
Secondly, this part examines whether the UK has deployed offensive cyber capabilities 
in real world situations to evaluate the UK’s preparedness to implement what it claims in 
the cyber doctrine. 
In September 2013, Philip Hammond, Defense Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, 
announced that the British army had established a cyber unit to increase the UK’s national 
security in cyberspace. The new Joint Cyber Reserve was assigned to develop “a full-
spectrum military cyber capability, including a strike capability, to enhance the UK’s 
range of military capabilities”173. The nature of these capabilities is not further specified. 
For strategic reasons, the ministry treats offensive cyber similarly to its nuclear arsenal, 
special forces or submarine patrols.174 When Hammond introduced the NCSS 2016-2021 
in November 2016, he underlined that UK further invests in offensive cyber technologies 
in order to have the opportunity to “strike back” when being attacked.175 It is certain that 
the UK possesses offensive cyber technologies but difficult to examine the power of these 
capabilities.  
One method of evaluating the strength of the arsenal is to look at the budget that has been 
spend for cyber security and offensive capabilities in particular. Since 2009, the British 
government has extensively invested into their cyber security. For a period of five years, 
the National Cyber Security Strategy 2011-2016 allocated investments of £860 million 
(around 980 million euro) into a cyber security program.176 The final report illustrates that 
more than half of the budget (£441.8 million) has been invested into “National Sovereign 
capability to detect and defeat high end threats” and 117.0 million into the “support to 
full spectrum effects capability”.177 There is no distinct number of the budget spend on 
offensive cyber capabilities. The report does not make a distinction between offensive 
and defensive capabilities. However, it can be assumed that investments into these 
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capabilities are higher, as the budget does not include investments by the Ministry of 
Defense. According to expert assumptions, the Ministry of Defense invests around £200 
million into offensive cyber capabilities per year.178 This figure is considerable high, but 
in relation to the total investments that the UK spends on cybersecurity, it can be expected 
that the UK invests a higher amount into defensive cyber capabilities. 
Moreover, the Annual Report 2016-2017 of the Intelligence and Security Committee of 
Parliament reveals an insight into the UK’s offensive cyber capabilities. The report states 
a considerable increase in the development of offensive cyber capabilities since 2014. 
Regarding the progress of the National Offensive Cyber Program, GCHQ has 
outperformed the stated objectives and doubled the number of capabilities, which the 
security organization aimed to reach.179 Even though the concrete numbers are redacted 
in the report, it points out the UK’s ability to use offensive strikes against advisories in 
cyberspace. 
Furthermore, the British government reveals in the NCSS 2016-2021 an allocation of £1.9 
billion to the cyber security institutions for the period of five years.180 The budget includes 
the establishment of a National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) as part of the British 
intelligence service GCHQ, which combines the Centre for Cyber Assessment (CCA), 
the Computer Emergency Response Team UK (CERT UK) and GCHQ’s information 
security arm.181  
The doubling of investments into cyber security underlines the UK’s efforts to achieve 
cyber resilience. The development of offensive cyber capabilities seems to be a crucial 
element to achieve this goal. In September 2018, newspapers announced that the Ministry 
of Defense and the GCHQ received funding in the amount of £250 million to build up a 
group of 2000 experts from security, military and industry in order to combat cyber 
threats.182 In how far these experts develop offensive or defensive capabilities is not clear. 
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To sum up, while the UK’s expenditure in cyber security is no more than a rough estimate, 
it helps to receive an inside look into the UK’s intentions in cyberspace. In the theoretical 
part, the thesis pointed out that developing full-scale attacks require considerate 
resources. The UK makes these resources available to strengthen its position in the cyber 
domain. Therefore, without being able to determine the exact offensive capability, the 
evidence allows to conclude that most likely, the UK backs its offensive doctrine with 
substantive offensive capabilities. 
Having illustrated the UK’s efforts to build develop offensive cyber capabilities, the 
question that brings together doctrine and capabilities is under which conditions the 
British government could use this arsenal. In the theoretical part, the thesis underlined the 
immense advantage of having offensive capabilities as a force multiplier in terms of 
military conflicts. When developing these capabilities, it is likely that the British military 
makes use of them not only for protection purposes but also to enhance their military 
power. Even though it is difficult for scientists to evaluate how and when the military or 
intelligence services use offensive capabilities, various statements indicate that the UK’s 
military has already used its offensive capabilities to attack a foreign server.  
Defense Secretary Michael Fallon, for instance, admitted several times that the UK made 
use of cyber-attacks in military operations against the Islamic State. In June 2017, in a 
speech at the Cyber 2017 Chatham House Conference, Fallon pointed out that  
“(…) we’re [the UK] making sure that offensive cyber is now an integral part of our 
arsenal. (…) Our National Offensive Cyber Planning allows us to integrate cyber 
into all our military operations. And I can confirm that we are now using offensive 
cyber routinely in the war against Daesh, not only in Iraq but also in the campaign 
to liberate Raqqa and other towns on the Euphrates. Offensive cyber there is already 
beginning to have a major effect on degrading Daesh’s [the Islamic State’s] 
capabilities.”183 
Jeremy Flemming, director of the GCHQ, confirms these operations by stating that the 
GCHQ and the Ministry of Defense are deployed offensive cyber capabilities against the 
Islamic State in order to “suppress their propaganda, hinder their ability to coordinate 
attacks and protected coalition forces on the battlefield.”184 These statements indicate that 
the UK prepared to deploy offensive cyber capabilities. As theorized in the first part of 
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this thesis, the crucial difference between cyber and kinetic weapons is that cyber 
operations are difficult to observe. While it is possible to take pictures of armed soldiers, 
tanks or combat aircrafts crossing a border to another state’s sovereign territory, the use 
of cyber weapons take place in secret and may remain covered. Even though the topic is 
often classified as secret information, open statements by security officials indicate the 
UK’s self-confidence in its pro-active approach in the cyber domain and has certainly 
deterrent effects. For this thesis, it highlights the UK’s offensive posture in cyberspace 
and underlines the preparedness of the UK government to make use of offensive cyber 
capabilities. 
 
4.2 Cyber posture of the Republic of Estonia 
 
4.2.1 Cyber doctrine 
In 2008, the Estonian Ministry of Defense published Estonia’s first cyber security strategy 
as one of the first states in the world to do so.185 The strategy highlights the necessity of 
inclusing the cyber domain in national security planning and creating a “cyber security 
culture”186 to increase the level of resilience in cyberspace. The strategy identifies threat 
actors, security vulnerabilities and outlines various areas to coordinate, discuss and 
develop Estonia’s cyber security for individuals, companies and government institutions. 
The document focuses on the following strategic objectives: implementation of a 
“graduated system of security measures”, increasing the competence and awareness of 
security related risks though research and training, development of a contemporary legal 
framework to ensure standards in cyber security and the promotion of international 
collaboration.187  
To ensure Estonia’s readiness in case of a cyber-attack, the strategy identifies three 
measures. First, imposing stricter requirements for companies operating with critical 
infrastructure should reduce the risk of major economic or human disasters in case of a 
cyber-attack. Second, the “identification and management of cyber- attacks, the 
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efficiency of network traffic monitoring and the ability to perform strategic and tactical 
analyses”188 should increase Estonia’s ability to counter cyber-attacks. Finally, the 
responsibilities, coordination and allocation of tasks between governmental institutions, 
agencies and companies should be clearly defined in order to establish an effective 
organizational structure.189 These measures indicate that Estonia’s first cyber security 
strategy takes a rather defensive stance. They aim at securing Estonian infrastructure 
systems without any contemplation of attacking networks that are located outside of 
Estonia’s territory. Thus, the strategy does not provide evidence of offensive actions in 
cyberspace.  
In 2014, Estonia adopted its second cyber security strategy for the period of 2014-2017.190 
The document revises the previous strategy and adopts objectives and ambitions to new 
challenges and developments in the cyber domain. The strategy includes an appraisal of 
current cyber security developments, sets guidelines to increase resilience in cyberspace, 
formulates aims and ambitions to be reached by 2017 and illustrates the evolved 
authorities which are part of Estonia’s organizational cyber security structure. To reach 
the general objective of the strategy191, the strategy formulates subgoals, which provide 
an insight into Estonia’s cyber posture. Various pre-emptive measures demonstrate 
Estonia’s defensive stance in cyberspace. First, Estonia constantly aims to manage, map 
and update ICT systems and establish alternative solutions in case of attacks on the cyber 
infrastructure or e-services.192 Second, Estonia seeks to store critical data in secure 
computer centers inside and outside of Estonian territory.193 In addition, the strategy 
outlines the adoption of a “national comprehensive monitoring, analysis and reporting 
system”194, which guarantees hazard detection in a timely manner. 
                                                          
188 Ibid., 14 
189 Ibid., 14–5 
190 Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication, ‘Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017’ 
191 General objective: “The four-year goal of the cybersecurity strategy is to increase cybersecurity 
capabilities and raise the population’s awareness of cyber threats, thereby ensuring continued confidence 
in cyberspace.” ibid., 8. 
192 Ibid., 8 and 9 
193 Estonia is about to open a data embassy in Luxembourg to store critical data outside the state’s 
territory. The aim is to protect critical information from cyber-attacks, natural disasters or physical attacks 
on datacenters. See for instance: E-Estonia, ‘Estonia to open the world’s first data embassy in 
Luxembourg’ and ibid. 
194 Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication, ‘Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017’, 9 
 52 
 
Moreover, the strategy dedicates one subgoal to the development of defensive cyber 
capabilities. Estonia seeks to use “active defense” in cyberspace by developing “military 
cyber defence capabilities”195. What exactly these defensive capabilities encompass and 
whether active defense includes the intrusion into foreign networks remains unclear. 
Strategic papers and documents lack a clear definition of how Estonia defines the term 
active defense. Official publications do not conceptualize whether active defense includes 
the intrusion into foreign networks.196 Therefore, it would be misleading to conclude that 
Estonia has offensive elements in its overall cyber strategy. At least Estonia has no intents 
to make use of offensive capabilities according to their doctrinal thinking. However, as 
the following section points out, various sources indicate that Estonia is considering the 
development of offensive cyber capabilities in a new cyber command. Furthermore, 
Estonia’s National Cyber Security Concept, which was published by the Ministry of 
Defense in 2017, affirms the state’s defensive cyber posture. The document outlines what 
the government must do to ensure updated information systems and provide trainings and 
advice to service providers.197  
To conclude, the analysis of Estonia’s cyber security strategies suggest that Estonia’s 
cyber doctrine is rather defensive in character. Accordingly, in terms of doctrine, 
Estonia’s cyber posture can similarly defined as defensive. The main measures Estonia 
uses to defend itself in the cyber domain are the constant mapping, managing and 
updating of networks, training of personnel, extending international cooperation and 
developing cyber defense capabilities. The elements coincide with the characteristics a 
defensive cyber posture as defined in the first part of this thesis.  
 
4.2.2 Cyber Capabilities 
The previous section pointed out that in terms of doctrine, Estonia’s cyber posture is 
rather defensive. However, when looking at cyber capabilities, there are various 
indications that Estonia develops offensive cyber capabilities in a targeted way. As 
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highlighted in the theoretical part of this thesis, every state has a certain amount of 
offensive cyber capabilities, which governments can use against aggressive threats. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that Estonia possesses capabilities that enable to counter a 
variety of devices that might attack Estonian critical infrastructure. However, it does not 
indicate that Estonia‘s cyber posture is offensive, as Estonia’s doctrine does not mention 
under which circumstances these capabilities could be deployed and whether these 
measures are used to attack foreign networks. 
While the overall emphasis of capabilities in the last years has been on setting up 
defensive capabilities, it seems that Estonia is in the process of developing limited 
offensive cyber capabilities to strengthen its defense. In August 2018, Estonia opened a 
new Cyber Command with the task of defending Estonian networks from hostile attackers 
and “to be prepared to carry out active cyber defence operations”198. The aim of the Cyber 
Command is to assamble a troop of up to 300 cyber specialists by 2020.199 Even though 
Estonia’s definition of active defense is blurred, various statements indicate that Estonia 
seeks to develop offensive code to penetrate foreign networks in times of war or allied 
military operations.  
For instance, Andres Hairk, commander of the Cyber Command, explains that the new 
Command is developing cyber capabilities that provide it with an extra tool to attack. 
Additionally, he stresses that this does not mean that Estonia will attack its neighbours in 
peacetime, but rather that it supports national defense.200 In another speech, Hairk states 
that in order to protect its own cyber infrastructure, the country must attack its own 
systems to find vulnerabilities on the one hand, and use these capabilities to support 
military operations in times of conflicts on the other hand.201 Moreover, Erki Kodar, 
undersecretary for legal and administrative affairs at the Estonian Ministry of Defense, 
points out in a speech on the new Cyber Command, that in order to increase cyber defense, 
states need to “develop the full range of cyber capabilities”, which means to focus not 
only on defense, but “on offense as well”202. Even though Estonia is reluctant to give clear 
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statements on the development of offensive cyber capabilities, the statements indicate that 
the country is at least considering the development of these tools. 
The theoretical part of this thesis discussed the high costs of making network systems 
resilient to cyber-attacks or developing offensive cyber capabilities. Regarding skilled 
labor, the public sector is in constant competition with private cyber security companies, 
especially in a small nation like Estonia. Obviously, Estonia has much fewer financial 
resources to invest into its cyber security than larger states. To guarantee the security of 
the state in cyberspace, the Estonian government established a cyber unit of the Estonian 
Defense League (Kaitseliit). The cyber unit consists of experts and security practitioners 
from the private, public and the third sectors. The civilian militia group aims to strengthen 
Estonia’s cyber resilience by conducting trainings and coordinated exercises. In addition, 
they are involved in the protection of critical infrastructure in case of attacks.203 Estonia’s 
strategic documents constantly highlight close cooperation between the public, private 
and third sector.204 The Cyber Unit pools cyber expertise from companies and 
government institutions and acts as an integrated part of Estonia’s national defense 
system. The National Defense League Act, adopted in 2013, provides the Cyber Unit a 
legal mandate, organisational framework and membership conditions.205 To sum up, the 
approach to create a voluntary based expert group of cyber specialists circumvents high 
costs for the Estonian state and offers a useful opportunity to share information between 
sectors.  
To conclude, this section identified Estonia’s cyber posture by analysing cyber doctrine 
and capabilities. In terms of intentions, it seems that Estonia adopts a defensive oriented 
posture in cyberspace. The intentional missing conceptualization of the vague term 
“active defense” allows a range of activities and makes it difficult to conclude that Estonia 
adopts offensive components into its cyber doctrine. In terms of capabilities, Estonia 
develops predominantly defensive cyber tools. However, the recent creation of a Cyber 
Command, whose work seems to include the development of offensive cyber capabilities, 
suggests that Estonia becoming active in developing offensive tools as an addition to its 
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defensive measures. Due to the lack of clear statements regarding these tools, there has 
not been a comprehensive discussion on costs and benefits for Estonia’s cyber protection.  
 
4.3 Comparison and discussion 
The analysis of the cyber posture of the UK and Estonia illustrates that deploying 
offensive cyber capabilities is a debated topic in both states. Regarding the overall 
posture, it can be concluded that while the UK has pursued an offensive cyber posture 
including offensive elements, Estonia adopts a defensive posture almost exclusively 
focused on defensive elements. The difference in offense and defense posture can be most 
clearly identified from the cyber doctrines. Whereas the UK adopts a doctrine that 
contains intentions to develop and deploy offensive capabilities, the Estonian cyber 
doctrine contains merely defensive measures. Whereas the UK publicly states their 
intentions to deploy offensive cyber capabilities whenever they considered it as 
necessary, Estonia’s doctrine does not provide any indication suggesting that the state 
adopts an offensive posture at present time. 
In terms of capabilities, the distinction is less clear. The UK demonstrates that it develops 
offensive cyber capabilities and admits that these have been already used for wider 
military ends. Estonia is more reluctant in this regard. Merely official statements and 
interviews indicate that Estonia develops offensive capabilities in its new established 
Cyber Command. Nevertheless, even when Estonia possesses limited offensive 
capabilities, the difference remains. The UK adopts an offensive and Estonia a defensive 
posture, as Estonia’s doctrine is, at present time, merely focused on the defense. 
Furthermore, the UK’s doctrine and development of cyber tools suggest that offensive 
cyber capabilities are rather an addition to the existing defensive measures. This opens 
the debate on the explanatory power of the offense-defense balance theory. In as much as 
a current advantage of the offensive can be assumed in cyberspace (see chapter 2.2.4), 
states as rational actors would be expected to adopt a posture which reflects this 
advantage, as it would maximize their security with most efficient use of resources. 
However, empirical evidence from the UK and Estonia indicate that this is not the case. 
Offensive capabilities are rather an additional tool that supplements a state’s cyber 
security. Even though various factors may indicate that offense has the advantage in 
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cyberspace, it would not lead to a situation that states predominantly invest into offensive 
cyber capabilities.  
Overall, this finding suggests that in contradiction with the incentives of an offense 
advantage, states still primarily invest in defense. Only some, in this case the UK as a 
large state, invests a portion of its resources in offensive capabilities. Estonia as a small 
state, which could be expected to be even more sensitive to the offense-defense balance, 
even focuses almost exclusively on defense. This means that while offense is thought to 
have the advantage, states rather invest in defensive cyber capabilities. Whereas large 
states seem to afford offensive cyber capabilities, small states rather opt for the defense. 
These findings requires explanation. The focus on defense instead of offense could be 
explained by various considerations. First, as indicated in the discussion on the offense-
defense advantage (chapter 2.2.4), the high costs to develop and maintain effective 
offensive cyber capabilities could not be justified in a cost-benefit calculation. Financial 
constraints force states to evaluate precisely whether the costs of developing offensive 
cyber capabilities are justified. Employing skilled labor is costly, especially in the highly 
competitive ICT sector. Even though offense has the advantage, this advantage pays only 
off in most sophisticated cyber-attacks, which are predominantly conducted on a state-to-
state level and occur relatively rare compared to low-level cyber-attacks. In this sense, 
the explanatory power of the offense-defense balance is reduced. 
Second, offense-defense balance and the security dilemma are limited to states as the 
most acute threat to national security. However, in the cyber domain, most threats do not 
come from state actors. Without investing into defensive capabilities, a state is exposed 
to a much larger amount of threat actors. When network systems are not secure, even 
attackers with limited knowledge are able to intrude and cause danger to a state’s 
infrastructure. This can explain predominant investments defensive capabilities, even if, 
at the upper end of the intensity spectrum of threats, offense might have the advantage. 
To sum up this discussion, state size seems to have an effect on a state’s cyber posture. 
While the UK adopts an offensive posture, Estonia’s cyber posturing is rather defensive. 
These findings do not coincide with majority view of an offensive advantage in 
cyberspace that was discusses in chapter 2.2.4. It seems that the development of offensive 
cyber capabilities are merely an addition to defensive measures, which primarily large 
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states can afford. Contrary to the expectations that small states are more sensitive to the 
balance and adopt an offensive cyber posture, the results of the analysis of Estonia’s cyber 
posture do not confirm this assumption. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
This research examined the effect of state size on cyber posturing of states bringing 
together assumptions of IR theory and the cyberspace. The thesis followed three main 
strands. First, it theorized the conventional offense-defense balance and explained its 
impact on state posture. Based on existing literature of neorealist thinkers, it outlined the 
factors that influence the balance and theorized how these factors could suggest states 
adopting an offensive or defensive posture. Second, the research applied the theoretical 
assumptions to the cyber domain and adjusted concepts according to the cyber 
environment. Finally, the thesis scrutinized how state size matters in adopting a particular 
cyber posture. The thesis argued that small states are more sensitive to the offense-defense 
balance due to their susceptibility to pressures (e.g. resource constraints, smaller margin 
of error). Whereas large states have more leeway, it was expected that small states mirror 
the offense-defense more closely. Using a most similar systems design, the empirical part 
examined the cyber posture of the UK and Estonia to elaborate the effect of the 
small/large factor on cyber posture of states. 
The thesis made several findings that have implications for further research. First, to 
answer the research question, the thesis demonstrated that state size has an impact on the 
cyber posture of state. Empirical evidence demonstrated that there is a difference in the 
cyber posture of small and large states. While the UK adopts an offensive cyber posture, 
Estonia’s strategic documents do not indicate the development of offensive cyber 
capabilities at present the time. In this regard, the empirical evidence does not coincides 
with the theoretical assumption that both small and large states adopt an offensive cyber 
posture.  
Second, the study demonstrated the applicability of the offense-defense balance to the 
cyber domain. The thesis pointed out that offensive and defensive cyber capabilities are 
better to distinguish than in the traditional domains. There is a clear difference between 
software that is programmed with the aim to monitor networks and prevent cyber-attacks 
on the one hand, and software that seeks to penetrate other network systems on the other 
hand. This consideration addresses the long-standing debate in the offense-defense 
literature, where the differentiation of offensive and defensive weapons and the question 
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of whether offense or defense has an advantage are controversially discussed. The 
literature-based comparison of arguments found out that most of the authors favoring an 
offensive advantage in cyberspace merely take technical features of offensive code into 
account. In contrast, adherents of a defensive advantage include the costs of developing 
these capabilities and argue that defensive capabilities overweigh in a cost benefit 
calculation. At present time, there is not enough empirical evidence to verify one of these 
assumptions. 
In addition, various conceptual factors needed adjustments to theorize the balance in 
cyberspace. Digitalization was utilized as an analogy to geography. Byte power and 
versatility in cyberspace were characterized according to firepower and mobility in the 
traditional domains. Theorizing digitalization as equivalent to geography is a new 
contribution to existing cyber security literature. The theoretical assumptions indicated 
that all factors in the cyber offense-defense balance seem to favor the offense. This 
finding is in line with the majority opinion that the offense has the advantage in 
cyberspace. 
Third, the research found explanations on how the offense-defense balance influences 
cyber posture. With the neorealist presumption that states take rational decisions and 
adopt a strategy that fits best to their aim of maximizing national security, the offense-
defense balance was expected to have an impact on a state’s cyber posture. The thesis 
demonstrated that the currently assumed offensive advantage does not imply that states 
predominantly invest in offensive cyber capabilities. Empirical evidence suggest that 
states develop offensive cyber capabilities rather as a complementary element in addition 
to defensive cyber measures. Whereas large states can afford offensive tools, small states 
rather focus on defensive cyber capabilities and adopt a defensive cyber posture. 
Fourth, the study contributed to the existing small state literature and theorized small 
state’s behavior in cyberspace. The thesis underlined that factors digitalization, byte 
power and versatility equally effect small and large states. Therefore, in line with offense-
defense theory, the thesis suggested that both small and large states follow the majority 
view and opt for an offensive cyber posture. However, as stated above, the empirical case 
of Estonia demonstrates the opposite. Moreover, the thesis demonstrated theoretically that 
small states are more sensitive to the offense-defense balance than larger powers. 
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Empirically, the sensibility of states towards the balance was difficult to measure without 
being confident regarding the advantage of offense or defense in cyberspace. Based on 
the assumption that small states are more sensitive to the balance, empirical findings 
rather indicate that defense has the advantage in the cyber domain. 
The difference between theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence can be explained 
by various reasons. First, the scrutinized states might not act rational. The offense-defense 
balance assumes that states take optimal decisions to increase their security. Both states 
could act irrational and disregard an offensive advantage. It requires further research in 
order to identify whether the cases are exceptional. Second, the offense might not have 
the advantage in cyberspace. As indicated in the second finding of this conclusion, the 
offense advantage in cyberspace is not accepted without criticism. Even though the 
majority assumes an offense advantage, this might not be the case. Another explanation 
is that decision makers do not perceive the offense as being advantageous. States adopt 
their cyber posture according to how they perceive the balance. In the relatively new cyber 
environment, they might be reluctant in following the majority view and invest in 
offensive rather than defensive cyber capabilities. 
In light of the above considerations, the thesis has various limitations. First, it compared 
only two cases. To confirm a difference in small and large cyber posture requires the 
examination of more cases. Nevertheless, this limited study of two cases provides an 
initial insight and suggests that there is a difference. Confirming this finding requires 
further exploration with a greater variety of cases. 
Second, the empirical discussion relied on relatively crude measurements. The 
availability of information is a challenge for all cyber researchers. At least the 
development of offensive cyber capabilities is often confidential information and not 
available to the public. While it poses a challenge for the validity of findings, the 
measurements used in this thesis are sufficient to conclude on offensive and defensive 
cyber posture. 
Finally, this study exclusively attempted to apply the logic of the offense-defense balance 
in the cyber domain. It derived its arguments mainly from theoretical assumptions that 
authors theorized for the traditional domains. However, the offense-defense balance is a 
debated variable in terms of measurement and applicability both in the traditional and the 
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cyber domain. Whereas nature of capabilities are better to distinguish in cyberspace, the 
advantage of offense or defense is unclear. It requires further research to evaluate whether 
the offense-defense balance can be considered as a useful tool to explain cyber posture.  
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